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  1. Introduction 
  
The official relationship between Finland and Colombia is turning 65 years this year. 
Today, in 2019, thanks to the global world, the two countries are perhaps closer to 
each other than ever before because of the new means of communications that 
facilitate the interconnectedness across the Atlantic Ocean. Despite the long physical 
distance, Colombian music, culture and peoples have reached the cold and distant 
country in the North and, equally, after the ending of the decades long conflict in 
Colombia, the interest towards Colombia is also growing in Finland. Politically the two 
countries which seem to have little in common are also finding mutual interests 
especially through economic cooperation.   
  
The aim of this thesis is to review the bilateral relationship between Finland and 
Colombia. The bilateral relationship will be analysed primarily with focus on the 
official diplomatic relationship between the two countries. This is done through 
especially the economic ties, as these has been the most relevant historically in the 
bilateral relations. This thesis theoretically reviews the political and economic 
development of the two countries with emphasis on both their historical contexts and 
the influence of the particularities of each state on the evolution of the bilateral 
relations.  A discussion on how the bilateral ties reflect the general foreign policy 
narrative of the countries will be provided and some consideration is also given to the 
possible future development of the relations. The reason why the narrative can be 
considered relevant for conducting a historical analysis through the bilateral relations 
is that it gives an idea of why certain things became relevant for each country in 
question in certain points during their history and how these changes can be seen 
reflected in the context of this case study. The examples in Finno-Colombian 
relationships thus help to identify larger trends in the historical narrative and 
demonstrate the practical applications of the countries’ foreign policy trends at 
different times. 
  
The timeline of this research is 1950 - 2018. This period was chosen because the start 
of 1960, after the diplomatic relations were established in 1954, is a point in time in 
which the contact between Colombia and Finland became more active, largely due to 
the growing coffee trade. Even though there was clear variation in the propinquity of 
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the relationship during the decades, there has never been a clear cut off point to the 
bilateral relations and thus the whole time-period chosen can be considered relevant 
for analysis.  
  
2. Theory and Method 
 
 
2.1 Liberal school of international relations  
  
According to Alasuutari, theoretical framework can mean a specifically defined point of 
view (Alasuutari, 2011, p. 79). In this research the theoretical framework is formed by 
political theory on international relations. The bilateral relationships will be considered 
in the larger context of world politics and even though a deeper analysis in the 
motivation of each actor outside the bilateral relations is not given, the general ideas 
of liberal school of thought are considered to be valid when constructing the political 
time series of the relations. 
 
Liberal school of international relations is based on the emphasis of international 
cooperation and mutual benefits over power politics 1  and implementation of 
international organizations and nongovernmental actors for shaping policy choices. 
Contrary to realism it emphasizes cooperation over conflict in which international trade 
and democracy are important tools in interconnectivity.  
  
When conducting the analysis of the bilateral relations, it is considered that both 
countries are liberal democracies, which supposedly base their foreign policies on the 
ideas of international trade, cooperation and organisations. This being the case, the 
historical timeline will be analysed through the assumption that the policy choices of 
both countries show tendencies associated with the liberal school of thought. 
Conclusions whether this will prove to be true will be given in the end. Great importance 
is also given to the commercial connection and bilateral trade, as this has been the 
foundation of the relationship between the two countries.  
                                                                
1 According to Lemke (2009) an idea that “distribution of power and resources or changes to those 
distributions, are fundamental causes of war and of system stability”. 
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The relations could have also been analysed by using realism 2 , but it can be 
considered that, since Colombia nor Finland are global superpowers and exist in vastly 
different geopolitical regions without real competition for influence or power as such, 
this analysis does not feel adequate when attempting to undertake a case study on the 
relationship between these two countries.  
 
Equally, the analysis could have been constructed through structural and post-
structural theories by taking into account the global system of politics which produces 
the countries’ foreign policies as well as the cultural and linguistic traditions of each 
country and its relations with others, but as the purpose of this research is not to 
provide a in depth analysis of the justification or effectiveness of the foreign policy of 
the countries in question but provide a chronological analysis of the Finno-Colombian 
relationship, this approach will not be used. The same applies to postmodern political 
theory, which will not be applied as for the superficial nature of this political analysis 
using just one school of thought, that is to say, the liberal, feels adequate. 
  
2.2 Narrativism 
 
The analysis of the time frame of the relations is constructed realising a case study on 
the bilateral relationship by utilizing the post-narrativist method of historical research. 
 
Narrativism, developed by Frank A. Ankersmit in the 1980’s, is a school of thought in 
philosophy of historiography which emphasises the narrative nature of historical 
documents. According to Kuukkanen (2015), the text “brings out the general 
perspective to the past and can be considered a suggestion about how to review it”. In 
his work Narrative Logic - A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language (1983) 
Ankersmit divided narrativism in two: narrative realism and narrative idealism. 
Narrative realism describes a text that aims to represent the past as it really was 
whereas narrative idealism paints a unique picture of the past which is more like a work 
of art than an accurate representation of the past (ibid.).  
                                                                
2 An extremely variable school of thought, in which the basic principle of the world order can be stated 
to be conflict amongst actors pursuing power. 
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The traditional historical realism is a school of thought in which historical research has 
been understood as creating a representation or a recreation of the past (Kuukkanen, 
2015). In this school of thought, the historical narrative can be seen as an accurate 
description and re-creation of the events in the past. In his theory of representation 
Ankersmit adds a third entity between the representation and actual past: according to 
him, the representation portrays an aspect of the past thus representing just this aspect 
of the past rather than the actual past itself (Ankersmit, 2012, Chapters p.64-81 & 157-
174). It can thus be seen, that the historical realism and narrativism are conflicting 
theories.  
 
Kuukkanen constructs his post-narrativistic theory on these two conflicting 
interpretations, arguing that historical analysis is a discursive and argumentative praxis 
which does not intend to tell the truth about the world or reflect the past but to make 
an argument for the historian’s own views. He states that it is important to note that the 
historian always operates in some kind of argumentative context (Kuukkanen, 2015) 
 
In this work, the Finno-Colombian relationship is analysed through a post-narrative 
research. This means that the historical narrative of the bilateral relationships can be 
understood as a kind of a representation of the past events, whilst still simultaneously 
being merely the author’s interpretation as well as a subjective view on the past events. 
The following analysis should be understood in the context of the Finnish view of the 
bilateral relationship by an author who works in a close contact with the Colombian 
diplomatic representation in Finland. 
 
Additionally, given that in this occasion the political research was conducted in Finland 
which set considerable difficulties in obtaining material from the Colombian side. 
Because of this, the analysis is disproportionate to the Finnish view on the relations 
but, whenever possible, the Colombian voice is also added. 
 
2.3 Methods 
  
5 
 
The research method used in this analysis is qualitative research, that is to say, 
explorative research in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the researched 
phenomena, conducted through multiple systems of enquiry. In case of this research, 
the methods of obtaining data were historical documents as well as thematic 
interviews. The source material chosen represents the available official documentation 
on the bilateral relations (the material from the Colombian side is not as readily 
available as the Finnish archives are). The aim of this research has been to collect all 
possible material to realise case study analysis on the events during the given historical 
time frame.  
  
The largest body of written source material comes from the archives of the Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This material was obtained by visiting the Ministry’s 
archives and requesting all the material dealing with Colombia. In total, the material 
constitutes of some 15 boxes of documents from the Finnish diplomatic representation 
accredited to Colombia, starting from the beginning of the 1950s and ending in 1993. 
It is worth noting that much of this documentation is classified and according to the 
Finnish legislation, is thus only made public 25 years after its creation.3 It is also worth 
mentioning that the material is preselected and set aside by the archives according to 
their judgement and/or cataloguing. From this material consulted, some 130 pages 
were selected to be used as source material for this research. 
 
Another important written source material was the autobiography by Erkki Alhanko. His 
book was utilized as a source material for early decades of the relationship as it is one 
of the only accessible written first-hand documentation of the Finno-Colombian 
relationships from the 1940’s onwards. Erkki Alhanko was the first Finnish 
representative of the Finnish Foreign Ministry in Colombia and thus had a major role 
in establishing and developing the bilateral affiliation.  
  
                                                                
3 In the first paragraph of the section 24 of Act of Openness of Government activities 621/1999 on 
Secret official documents it is stated that; Unless specifically provided otherwise, the following official 
documents shall be secret: (1) the documents of the Government Foreign Affairs Committee, unless 
otherwise decided by the Committee, as well as the political assessments of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and the Finnish missions abroad, the documents concerning political or economic negotiations 
with a foreign state and the coded messages in the field of foreign affairs administration, unless 
otherwise decided by the Ministry. In section 31 of the same Act, the period of secrecy of official 
document is set at 25 years (Finlex, 621/1999). 
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In addition to written sources, interviews were also conducted with official parties 
relating to the bilateral relationships. From the Colombian side the interviewees 
included Fulvia Elvira Benavides Cotes, Chargé d’Affaires e.p. of Colombia in Finland 
2013-2018 as well as Antero Pajari, the Honorary Consul of Colombia in Finland from 
1979 to the present.  These individuals were selected because of the small number of 
those representing the Colombian side of the bilateral relationships available in 
Finland. They had the longest and most extensive experience and knowledge of the 
topic of this research. From the Finnish representation in Colombia Mikko Pyhälä, 
Ambassador of Finland in Venezuela, accredited to Colombia 2006-2011 was also 
interviewed. The interview of the Ambassador Pyhälä was necessary in order to obtain 
information on the period of the timeframe of this research from which written 
documents are not accessible.  
  
The interviews conducted were executed by utilising the thematic interview as 
defined by Hirsjärvi & Hurme (2008, p. 48): in a thematic interview, instead of 
concentrating on detailed questions, the important point is that the interview is guided 
by relevant themes and thus the questions asked from the different interviewees can 
vary as long as the theme remains. The interviews were also mostly unstructured in a 
sense that even though some of the questions were prepared beforehand, in practice 
the interviews were relatively informal and free flowing. The research during these 
somewhat unstructured conversations was conducted, as Klenke (2008, p. 129) 
defines, by “probing” into interesting and relevant topics that arose during the 
conversation.  
 
This form of interview was chosen because all the individuals interviewed were 
related to the case purely by their profession and before asking the questions, it was 
unclear how much knowledge they had on the historical events researched. Due to 
this, the topics of conversation was prepared for each interviewee, but it was not 
possible to define the actual content of relevant questions before the conversation. 
Equally, it was necessary to have the possibility to probe into details and follow up 
any interesting comments with more in-depth questions - a task that would have 
been difficult to achieve through a structured interview. 
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When reviewing the source material critically, it can be stated that the source 
material used is mostly primary sources of information as it has been produced by 
government officials by both states. However, the reliability of the information 
provided in the sources can somewhat vary; especially the internal reports of the 
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs can be judged as accurate, reliable and error free 
information on the Finnish position as it has been produced for internal use and not 
edited for the purpose of creating an image for an outside audience. It should be 
noted, however, that in Alhanko’s memoir as well as the interviews the information 
might have been edited or represented in different way from the actual reality as it 
was intended for public use. This has been taken into account when conducting the 
analysis.  
 
3. Context and previous research 
 
2.1 Previous research 
 
Previous academic research into the bilateral relationship between Colombia and 
Finland has been quite scarce. The article collection “Kahvi, Pahvi ja Tango” by 
Pakkasvirta & Aronen (1998) features several articles with mentions of commercial and 
historical contacts between the two countries, although there are no works dedicated 
solely to Colombia. No academic monograph features information about the 
relationships, and shorter articles are also rather difficult to come by - if they exist. 
  
However, other academic works indirectly dealing with Finno-Colombian relationships 
are Päivi Vaahterikko-Mejía’s doctoral thesis “Cultural differences in Ibero-Nordic 
communications: perceptions about Finnish and Colombian negotiators” (2001) as well 
as Eemeli Jokelainen’s Batcherlor’s thesis “Kansainvälinen konttikauppa - Case 
Kolumbia” (2015). Both of these works are on a smaller, more detailed case-study base 
and deal solely with the communicative, cultural as well as the commercial aspects of 
the relationship and do not elaborate or give a larger picture of the relations in general. 
Despite this, the latter is used as a source material for this research.   
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Interesting source material for research can also be found from a memoir “Konsulina 
Kolumbiassa - kauppaa kaukomailla 50 vuotta” by Erkki Alhanko, as well as “Desde 
el final de la tierra” by the Chargé of Affairs of Colombia in Finland in 1994, Jose 
Neira Rey. Both of these books have been utilized in this research as source 
material, though Alhanko constitutes as a considerably richer source of information. 
There are also other non-academic windows through which to look at the contacts 
that have existed over the years; as an example, the several documentative series 
that have dedicated episodes to Fredrik Thomas Adlercreutz4 and Tummien Laulujen 
Maa, the memoir of Totte Mannes, the wife of Eeros Mannes (a Finnish businessman 
operating in the paper industry) about their time in Colombia, could be mentioned 
even if they are not used in this thesis. 
 
3.2 Aim of this research 
  
The aim of this research is to create a cohesive picture of the bilateral relationship 
during the time frame chosen as well as to give a political and economic overview on 
the foreign policy of each country and how this reflects in the Finno-Colombian 
relationships.  
 
After forming the narrative picture, this research aims to answer especially the 
following questions:   
  
How well does the bilateral relationship between Finland and Colombia reflect 
the official historical narrative of the foreign policy of each country? 
  
Why has the economic potential of the Finno-Colombian relationships not been 
able to be realised and how has the domestic policy influenced the foreign 
policy and economic capacities of Colombia? 
  
What does the future of the bilateral relationship look like? 
                                                                
4 See for example Yle Areena series “Hurjia suomalaisia: Sotilas rakastuu señoritaan” or Huhta, 2003. 
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4. Historical background 
 
4.1 Foreign policy and diplomacy in general 
  
In this section an overview of the significance of foreign policy and diplomacy in 
general, as well as a brief look into the historical development of diplomacy will be 
taken. 
 
According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, foreign policy can be defined as:  
 
General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in 
its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is 
influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behaviour of other 
states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Diplomacy is the 
tool of foreign policy, and war, alliances, and international trade may all be 
manifestations of it (2019). 
 
In this work, this definition of foreign policy is accepted, and diplomacy is considered 
to be the most important tool in practicing it. On its part, diplomacy can be defined as:  
  
The profession, activity or skill of managing international relations, typically by 
a country’s representatives abroad (Oxford Dictionary, 2018). 
  
In its most typical manifestation of today, diplomacy is practised in foreign missions, 
usually in Embassies and consulates and is led by an ambassador. The ambassador 
can be a career diplomat, but in some occasions, individuals can also be named in 
diplomatic positions because of political reasons. Generally, however, most modern 
states have, as part of their Foreign Ministry, a group of individuals who serve as 
diplomats completing predetermined cycles of services in the missions abroad and at 
home. These individuals, whether political appointees or career diplomats, are 
classified in the diplomatic rank which is regulated by international law and several 
conventions.   
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It is often considered, that somewhat modern diplomacy started in the Renaissance 
Italy (Koskela et al., 2016 p. 8), but its roots can be traced back to the ancient Greece 
the city states which used heralds, accredited agents charged with the functions of the 
royal households, amongst other things (Nicolson, 1950 p. 20-21). The profession of 
diplomacy was recognised by the Italian states in the 15th century when they began 
appointing permanent Ambassadors (ibid., p. 26). The diplomats were now considered 
to be representatives of the sending state in the country they resided in and their 
personal moral and political views were no longer questioned as they were seen as 
“neutral” extension of their government. Relating to this, were also granted privileges 
such as extending the immunity of the diplomatic person to their property and actions 
(Koskela, Lahe & Ridanpää, 2016, p. 8).   
  
After the diplomatic representations developed into permanent ones over the 
centuries, the foundation of professional diplomacy in its modern form was laid down 
with the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 (Nicolson, 1949, p. 9) and the Congress of 
Aix-la-Chapelle on 1818 (see for example Phillips, 1911). These congresses came 
about as part of a shift in diplomatic practises which Nicolson (1949, p. 70) calls a 
“transition from old diplomacy to new. These changes can largely be attributed to the 
shift in the form of governance that swept Europe as old Empires crumbled and 
monarchies gave way to more democratic and parliamentary governments all around 
the continent.   
  
During these conferences the issues of prestige between the countries was 
addressed,5 but the ranking of the representatives was still divided in two; “great 
nations” were allowed to name extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors, whilst 
smaller countries only ambassadors. This, of course lead into the questions about 
which countries constituted as “great nations” (Koskela et al. 2016, p. 8). These issues 
were resolved after the Second World War, after which all countries were allowed to 
appoint ambassadors of equal rank. 
  
                                                                
5 Previously there had been constant problems in between the diplomats over the hierarchy and 
superiority as the order of importance of the countries was rigid and defined by the pope thus 
eliminating the importance of, for example, seniority in the diplomatic corps. 
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The most important document of the diplomacy as we know it today is the Vienna 
Convention of 1961, in which all the principles on diplomatic relations, formed during 
the previous centuries, were gathered together and the diplomatic immunities were 
defined. On the following year, it was followed by the Vienna Convention on consular 
affairs. Both of these documents were formed in order to ensure the most efficient and 
standardized manner to manage a permanent diplomatic representation abroad, 
leaving out any possibility of multiple ways of interpretation and potential misuse of 
diplomatic privileges. They oblige the foreign representatives to follow the law of the 
country they are posted in - even if they do enjoy diplomatic immunity (Koskela et al., 
2016, p. 9).    
  
It can be stated that diplomacy corresponds to the traditional division of relations 
between states; its main objective has been with taking care of politics and enhancing 
trade. However, according to Koskela et al. (p. 10), the role of the diplomatic 
representations in the modern world have somewhat shifted from the “representing the 
Country and supervising its political, economic and educational interests” (as defined 
in, for example, the Finnish law on foreign affairs6) to increasingly encompass cultural 
aspects. The cultural relations have developed into a so called “third” dimension of 
international relations and in recent decades diplomacy has started to move towards 
integrating this new facet of enhancing the relationships outside the traditional realm 
(more about cultural relations see e.g. Mitchell, 1986). Cultural aspects have become 
increasingly inseparable part of not just bilateral, but also the multilateral cooperation, 
as well as key characteristics of international organisations (consider e.g. UNESCO). 
Koskela et al. (2006, p. 10) note, that political, economic and cultural work can often 
not even be separated from each other as knowing the culture enhances commerce 
and tourism and cultivating a good image of the country is also part of political 
influencing. 
  
According to Mitchell (1986, p. 5), cultural diplomacy “seeks to impress, to present a 
favourable image, so that diplomatic operations as a whole are facilitated”. In Colombia 
cultural diplomacy has taken the form of Plan de Promoción de País as well as 
Diplomacia Deportivo y Cultural, both of which are the Foreign Ministry’s programs 
                                                                
6 See Finlex 204/2000 
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through which artists, musicians and sport representatives visit other countries in order 
to promote Colombia. On the Finnish side, the cultural institutes, operating in 17 
different countries, do not just represent and promote Finnish art but act as a good 
example of the cultural cooperation. 7 The cultural institutes also form part of Team 
Finland, Finland’s “network of public sector actors providing internationalisation 
services”, together with several ministries (Team Finland, 2018). 
 
The growing cultural aspect of diplomacy is an interesting development in 
intergovernmental relationship, but beyond this brief look into its basic meaning in the 
Finno-Colombian relationship it will not be further analysed in this thesis because of 
the limitation of space and an attempt to keep the focus more concise. These cultural 
aspects and the effect this have had on the relationship between Finland and 
Colombia would be an interesting topic for future research 
 
4.2 Colombia 
  
Colombia is a country located in the north-west of South America, at the point where 
Central America connects to the South American continent. It is the only South 
American country with coastline both on the Pacific and Caribbean Sea and one of the 
13 countries the equator passes through which means that, for the most part, the 
country is on the tropical climate zone. However, the Andes, that run through the 
country from the south-west to the north-east do not just create big climatic differences 
but divide Colombia to different geographical zones. These zones have been 
historically rather isolated from each other because of long distances and poor 
connections between the regions (Hunter, 1962 p. 7).  
 
The country, then, is divided into three climate zones, usually referred to as tierra fria 
(over 2000 metres above the sea level), tierra templada (900-2000 metres above the 
sea level) and tierra caliente (with less than 900 metres of altitude) (Banco de la 
República de Colombia, 2014). Naturally, the country’s different climate zones also 
                                                                
7 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Finnish institutes do not operate under that Foreign 
Ministry or respond to it but are managed by independent private foundations working in collaboration 
with the Ministry. Thus, it can be argued they do engage into cultural diplomacy but are not part of the 
official foreign policy planning or creation of the country image abroad.  
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mean different vegetational zones and that various commercial crops can be cultivated 
in different parts of the region. Coffee and cut flowers are the two largest agricultural 
exports.  Coffee, especially, has played a major role in forming Colombian identity in 
the world of global trade. Other major crops include banana, soy, sugarcane, cotton 
and oil palm. Mining is also an important commercial activity and the mining exports 
include oil,8 coal, gold and, to a lesser degree, emeralds (Observatory of Economic 
Complexity, 2019).  
 
Colombian population stands at approximately 45,5 million and whilst it has a high birth 
rate, there has also been high rates of emigration which has kept the population growth 
on a relatively moderate level (DANE, 2018). Whilst urbanization has been increasing 
in the past decades, swelling the number of inhabitants especially in the capital Bogotá 
(8 million people) and other large cities such as Medellin (3 million), the percentage of 
the country’s urban population is “only” 77,8% of the total population; a relatively low 
number in the Latin American context (ibid.).   
  
 
As stated, coffee has traditionally been the most important plant of cultivation in 
Colombia when considering the international markets. The coffee production was 
started in the early 19th century, but it did not become an important product of export 
until second half of the century. As the world economy expanded, demand for coffee 
grew in the United States as well as Germany and France, and Colombian coffee 
production increased in order to take advantages of the lucrative markets. Even 
though the Colombian coffee industry experienced setbacks at the turn of the century 
because of the fall of international coffee prices and the Thousand Day War9, the 
industry grew dramatically at the start of the 20th century, thanks to the long-term 
politics and the creation of National Federation of Coffee growers in 1927 
(FEDECAFE). It administered and managed all the revenue from the duties of coffee 
exports on behalf of the National Government as well as actively participates in 
formulation and implementation of national policy for coffee industry. This new 
organisation meant that Colombia became the second of the largest producers and 
                                                                
8 Which today is Colombia’s most important export product. 
9 Guerra de los Mil Días was a civil armed conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties as 
well as radical factions, lasting from 1899 to 1902 
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exporter of coffee in the world (after Brazil) and the Colombian coffee has become 
synonymous with some of the best quality coffee in the world. 
  
A significant aspect of the Colombian agricultural sector is, of course, also the illegal 
cultivating of coca plants and the production of cocaine, which, from the 1980’s 
onwards has grown to be the most important source of income for the anti-
governmental guerrilla groups and criminal organisations. Cocaine has been a 
massive problem for the country, and the government has struggled to limit and control 
it. In 2004 Colombia produced 80% of the cocaine trafficked in the global markets 
(Mason, 2010 p. 330-333) and during the last decade the government has made great 
efforts in destroying the illegal cultivations and, as part of the peace treaty of 2016, 
offered subsidy programmes for farmers who substitute their coca crops for other 
plants such as cocoa beans and fruits (BBC, 2017). 
  
Unlike many other Latin American countries, during its history, Colombia has been 
majorly ruled by constitutional civil governments after its independence in 1819. 
However, despite the constitutional civil rule or, in part perhaps because of it - as the 
state has always remained a rather weak actor - the extremely divided Colombia has, 
throughout its whole history, suffered from violent conflicts that have majorly influenced 
the way the country has been shaped. Colombians have lived through nine civil wars 
after gaining independence; the first one, led by the legendary military leader Simon 
Bolívar against the Spanish, broke out in 1812 and, it could be argued, the last one 
came to an end in 2016 when the biggest leftist guerrilla group, FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), signed the peace treaty with the Colombian 
government.10 
  
This however, is not to say that the conflicts have ended in the country - there are still 
armed groups such as the guerrilla organisation ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) 
and drug cartels, which continue a politically or economically motivated war against 
the Colombian state. Colombia also remains one of the most economically divided and 
unequal Latin American countries where social and economic realities starkly differ 
between the rich elite and the poorer population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). 
                                                                
10 More about FARC as well as this peace process in the Analysis-chapter 
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It could thus be stated, that Colombia’s complicated and conflict-ridden history of 
violence has still not seen its closing chapters, but at least on the surface the situation 
is vastly improving. 
  
When considering the political system of Colombia is, according to its Constitution: 
 
“A social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary 
republic, decentralized, with autonomy of its territorial units” (Article 1) 
And 
The President of the Republic is the Chief of State, head of government, 
and supreme administrative authority. The national government is 
composed of the President of the Republic, the Cabinet ministers, and the 
directors of administrative departments. The President and the minister or 
director of the appropriate department represent the government in any 
particular issue (Article 115). 
  
According to the Economic Intelligence Unit Colombia is classified as a flawed 
democracy.11  
  
4.2.1 Brief history of the Colombian foreign policy 
  
The Republic of Gran Colombia was established in 1819 when the state gained its 
independence from the Spanish crown and united present-day Colombia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela and Panama as well as parts of Peru, Brazil and Guyana as one country 
which was governed by Simon Bolívar from 1819 until his death in 1830. Within this 
Pan-American nation there were internal struggles for power, and the union of the 
regions did not last long: by the time of Bolívar’s death the country had reduced to the 
territory more or less corresponding to present-day Colombia and Panama. During the 
rest of the 19th Century, Colombia experienced various different forms of governance12 
                                                                
11 A nation “where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honored but may have issues 
(e.g. media freedom infringement). These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, 
including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the 
functioning of governance.” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016. 
12 See, for example Jimeno 2009. 
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resulting into a national state as defined by the 1886 constitution.13 It is perhaps more 
logical to start analysing the foreign policy of the nation after the creation of this modern 
state of Colombia. 
  
Ever since the start of the 20th century, the foreign policy of Colombia has been defined, 
as is the case with most Latin American countries, by its relationship with the global 
super power of the region – the United States.14 The leading elite has felt that by 
positioning itself close to the US, Colombia would achieve a more “privileged position” 
in the world order. In reality, however, this has led the country to be more of an object 
than a subject in the international stage. It has also guaranteed the country economic 
and military resources beyond its own capacity specially to deal with internal conflicts 
(Dallanegra, 2002). 
  
Another important general factor in the external relations of Colombia is that its 
governments have traditionally practised more “personal and corporate diplomacy” 
than foreign policy (Dallanegra, 2002). As the Colombian system as well as the foreign 
policy is led by the President, each government has defined its foreign policy objectives 
mainly based on the way they have understood national interests. This has led to 
fragmented foreign policy with little continuation from one government to another. It is 
also interesting to note that Colombia has during its history lost 54% of its territories.15 
According to Angarita (2016), this is largely because the armed forces of the country 
have always been tied into internal conflicts instead of being able to defend the 
sovereignty of the national territory. 
  
After the conflict over Panama Canal with United States,16 Colombia was involved in 
series of border conflicts with its neighbours in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s. The 
                                                                
13 This was achieved through a political project called La Regenración or Regeneration, headed by 
Rafael Nuñez Moledo (President of Colombia between 1880-1884 and 1888-1894). 
14 This is often referred to as Respice Polum or looking at the Polar Star or, in this sense, the North 
and thus to the United States 
15 If considered that Colombia represents a continuum of the same state as Gran Colombia. 
16 Colombia had assumed the project in 1888 from the French engineer Fernando de Lessep who had 
started it with cooperation from the United States. Colombia rejected the United States’ terms about 
the land ownership around the canal which lead to a conflict between the countries and ultimately the 
separation of Panama from Colombia in 1903. After the conflict, United States compensated Colombia 
with 25 million dollars and special privileges in the usage of the Canal in 1921.  (See, for example, 
McCullough, 1977) 
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economic crisis of 1929 17  also affected Colombia as the global coffee prices 
plummeted. This lead the government of Enrique Olaya Herrera into signing an 
economic agreement with United States, and, for example, giving it rights to exploit 
Colombia’s oil and rubber reserves. His follower, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, highlighted 
the importance of global institutions and Colombia joined the League of Nations18 as a 
founding member in 1920. This represented a new trend in the Colombian foreign 
policy, the “juridical” policy which stresses the importance of global organisations19 in 
the external relations of the country. During Eduardo Santos Montero’s presidency 
from 1938, the United States became, for the first time, the biggest market for 
Colombian products as the Second World War made it more complicated to sell goods 
to the traditional importers - Spain, France and Great Britain (Dallanegra, 2002). 
  
The conflict between the leftist guerrillas and the Colombian state in the 1960’s20 did 
not have a major impact on the country’s relations with its neighbours until the 1980’s; 
as the armed groups began to operate in the border regions, several military 
confrontations expanded to neighbouring states. 21  However, according to the 
Constitution of 1991 Article 9, “the foreign policy of Colombia will be oriented toward 
the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean” (p. 5). Colombia is part of the 
Association of Caribbean States (ACS), Caribbean Community, Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the Andean Community, as well as the Pacific Alliance22. 
Currently the Colombian President Ivan Duque is heading a creation of an integration 
body called Prosur, or Forum of Progress and Development of South America, to 
replace the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), from which Colombia 
withdrew in 2018.   
 
 
4.3 Finland 
  
                                                                
17 Known as the Great Depression, which started by the stock market crash on Wall Street plummeting 
the United States into a deep economic recession which had a global impact. 
18 Which later became the United Nations in 1942. 
19 A trend that has since been maintained in the country’s foreign policy planning. 
20 Explored in more detail later in the ‘Analysis’ chapter 
21 See for example Ramirez, 2002 
22 A Latin American trade bloc formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  
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Finland is a country located in the Northern Europe with land borders with Sweden, 
Norway and Russia. It is a Nordic country and, together with Scandinavia, is situated 
in the geographical region of Fennoscandia.  
  
Finland’s population is approximately 5,5 million people with most of it concentrated in 
the southern region and around the capital area. The level of urbanization is 85%, but 
this can be largely explained by the small size of Finnish towns and urban centres 
(more than 15 000 people) and the effect this has on the statistics (Tilastokeskus).  
  
Finland is one of the world’s most northernmost countries. It is mostly located in the 
circumboreal region and can be further divided into taiga, mixed forest and grasslands. 
Some 78% of Finland is forest and 10% of the area is rivers, lakes and ponds leaving 
little cultivated land (Luke, 2013). Finland’s climate type is mostly subarctic with the 
southernmost regions showing characteristics of maritime and continental climate with 
warm summer humid continental type, whilst the northern tip of the country rests in the 
tundra zone. Because of the geographical factors, Finland is not a large surplus 
producer on the agricultural sector but has significant resources in timber, minerals 
such as iron, chromium, copper, nickel and gold, and fresh water. The country’s 
exports are mainly in wood products, but in recent years diesel fuels have become the 
biggest export 23 . Finland also exports electronics, machinery, vehicles and other 
engineered metal products as well as chemicals (Kauppalehti, 8.3.2018). 
  
Finland was formed as a uniform political entity in 1809 when Sweden lost the Finnish 
territory to Russia. The country was established as an autonomous Grand Duchy of 
Finland within the Russian Empire. Finland had been part of the Kingdom of Sweden 
since the middle ages, and even after it became part of the Russian empire, the 
Swedish legislation was kept in place. The country also remained bilingual with Finnish 
being the language of the majority, but Swedish continuing as the language of 
governance and a large minority. During the 19th century, Finland acquired its own 
monetary unit and stamps as well as improvements to the status of the Finnish 
language which highlighted the Finnish identity as a separate one in relation to Russia. 
The larger russification policies of the non-Russian minorities, also including Finland, 
                                                                
23 Finnish companies refine crude oil as well as produce biodiesels from other sources   
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by the Russian governments in the 19th-early 20th century encountered passive 
resistance and ultimately contributed to the political willingness of the Finns to strive 
for independence after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917. 
  
The most important export in Finland has, as stated, historically been wood products. 
The first product of export was tar, which became an important industry in the area of 
Oulu in the 15th century in order to satisfy the demand of tar for the ships of the large 
naval powers Great Britain and Holland. Oulu was one of the biggest tar production 
centres in Europe alongside of Arkangel and tar the most important export product for 
the area that is now known as Finland (Lyytimäki & Hakala, 2008, p. 314-315). Later, 
in the 19th century, timber rose in importance as an export as well because of the 
domestic demands and especially the rapid growth of the domestic industry in the 
1870’s which contributed to the industrialization of the whole country. The biggest 
destination of export continued to be Great Britain. The saw industry continued to be 
the most important wood industry of the country up until the 1950’s, but the paper 
products became the biggest export already in the 1930’s. The biggest market for 
paper products was the Soviet Union. In the 1950’s and 1960’s the forest industry 
became extremely large in Finland, partly because of the war reparation for the Soviet 
Union.24 In the 1980’s, the forest companies started to become more international and 
grow in size through acquisitions and fusions (Kolbe, 2003, p. 285-289). 
  
According to its constitution in Finland: 
  
The powers of the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are 
represented by the Parliament (Section 2). The Parliament is unicameral. 
It consists of two hundred Representatives, who are elected for a term of 
four years at a time (Section 24). The President of the Republic makes 
decisions in Government on the basis of motions proposed by the 
Government (Section 58). The Government consists of the Prime 
Minister and the necessary number of Ministers (Section 60). 
  
                                                                
24 After the Continuation War Finland was ordered to pay $226,500,000 worth of war reparations, 
which were mostly paid in vessels and ships as well as wood and metal products. As a result, the 
metal industry of Finland also grew considerably. 
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The Economist Intelligence Unit has rated Finland a full democracy25. 
 
Finland is considered to be one of the least corrupt countries with high equality 
between the sexes (Transparency International, 2019). It also has below average 
income differences within the European context and has consistently ranked in the top 
5 in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)26. After the civil war 
in the 191827 there has been no intrastate conflict in the country and Finland is also 
considered the least fragile state in the world with a stable democracy (Fund for Peace, 
2017). In 2018, Finland was ranked as the “happiest country in the world”, meaning 
that its citizens had the best access to basic services and least unstable living 
conditions in the world (Helliwell et al., 2018). 
  
4.3.1 Brief history of the Finnish foreign policy 
  
According to the Finnish constitution, “Finland participates in international co-
operation for the protection of peace and human rights and for the development of 
society” and, according to §93, “the foreign policy of Finland is directed by the 
President of the Republic in cooperation with the Government” (Finlex, 731/1999). 
  
After the country had recovered from the bloody civil war in 1918, which halted the 
development of foreign relations right after its independence, Finnish foreign policy 
was reorganised on a more stable basis. Finland established formal relationships 
with the Soviet Union and sought possibilities for cooperation from the bordering 
regions. However, according to professor emeritus of history Seppo Hentilä, the only 
viable option for the Finnish foreign policy in its geopolitical reality was the so called 
“glorious isolation”, with neutrality and international cooperation through League of 
                                                                
25 A nation, “where civil liberties and basic political freedoms are not only respected, but also 
reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles. These nations have 
a valid system of governmental checks and balances, independent judiciary whose decisions are 
enforced, governments that function adequately, and media that is diverse and independent. These 
nations have only limited problems in democratic functioning”. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016. 
26 A worldwide study measuring the 15-year-old school pupil’s performance in mathematics, science 
and reading in the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 
27 Fought between the conservative “whites”, and the “reds”, who mostly composed of industrial and 
agrarian workers and lead by the Social Democratic Party 
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Nations in its centre (Saukkonen et al., 2008). This policy continued during the first 
decades of the 20th century.  
  
The situation changed dramatically in 1939 after Germany attacked Poland starting 
the Second World War. Finland declared itself neutral together with all other Nordic 
states, but after failed negotiations with the eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union 
attacked Finland in November of the same year. The so-called Winter War ended in 
March 1940 and Finland agreed to the peace terms, which meant loss of territories 
from the Eastern part of the country.  One could argue that partly because of the 
hopes of recovering those territories, the Finnish government decided to participate 
to the Germany’s operation against the Soviet Union in late spring of 1941 starting 
the Continuation War (Vehviläinen, 1991 p. 129). After three years of fighting, the war 
ended with the Moscow Armistice in 1944. Soviet Union demanded that Finland 
drove German troops from its territory, which eventually lead to Lapland War28 1944-
45. Finland was also required to sever diplomatic ties with Germany. 
 
The post-war foreign policy of Finland had in its aim two main objectives: to obtain 
permanent condition of peace through which the country could leave the limitations of 
sovereignty dictated in the Moscow Peace Agreement behind and return to state of 
normality and to gain good relationships based on trust with the Soviet Union in order 
to prevent future conflicts. This policy reached its goal in April 1948 when Finland 
and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance. The most important parts of this agreement concerned military positions 
and cooperation, and, in it, Finland pledged to stay out of the great-power conflicts. 
Even though Finland was accepted to join the United Nations already in the Paris 
Peace Treaty of 1947, this was one of the things that could not happen until 1955 
because of disagreements between the great-powers29. In the same year, Finland 
joined the Nordic Council (Vehviläinen, 1991 p. 129). 
  
The events of 1960’s and 1970’s represent a time in Finnish foreign policy often 
describe with the word “Finlandization”, which has come to mean a situation in which 
                                                                
28 A conflict of limited casualties which however left Finnish Lapland devastated. 
29 In practise, Finland’s application was blocked by the Soviet Union in the Security Council until the 
tensions between the superpowers had somewhat eased in the 1950’s (Eduskunta). 
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one powerful country makes its smaller neighbour abide with its foreign policy rule. 
This was largely the case with Finland and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
However, despite the close relationship between the countries also on the economic 
sector, Finland’s biggest economic interests were in the markets of the Western 
Europe to which Finland aimed to integrate itself within the given political framework. 
It fortified the cooperation with OEEC30 until it became a full member of OECD.31 
Finland also joined GATT as well as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank. However, membership in the European Economic Community was not an 
option within the neutral foreign policy (Vehviläinen, 1991 p. 129). Even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union Finland has not became a member of NATO32, though 
the membership is a topic that regularly surfaces in the political dialogue when 
considering the objectives of the foreign policy. 
 
5. Analysis 
 
5.1 In the Beginning: Starting the trade after the Second World War 
 
The relationship between Colombia and Finland has been naturally rather distant 
because of the large geographical separation, but some contact was established 
already during the earliest moments of the Colombian history when General Count 
Fredrik Thomas Fredrik Adlercreutz from Porvoo became one of the heroes in the 
Colombian war of independence and later the governor of the town of Mompox (Riiho, 
1998, p. 22-24). 
  
The Finnish Foreign Ministry’s country profile (Ulkoministeriö, 2018) states Colombia 
recognised Finland as an independent country on the last day of 1919 and official 
diplomatic relationships were established in 1954. The commercial relationship 
between the two countries were greatly facilitated by Honorary Consul Erkki Alhanko 
and the Pajari-family. 
                                                                
30 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the predecessor of OECD 
31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development founded in 1961 to replace OEEC to 
advance economic progress and world trade. 
32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental military alliance headed by United States 
of America 
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By the 1940’s, according to Alhanko, the stance of Finland’s Foreign Ministry was the 
Finns “knew” countries like Brazil and Argentina “so well that there was nothing else to 
learn about them” but countries which were little known in the Foreign Ministry included 
“Colombia and Venezuela” (Alhanko, 2009, p. 33). Because of this, the Finnish Minister 
of Commerce and Industry Uuno Takki and Minister of Social Welfare Yrjö Murto 
recommended that Alhanko travelled to Colombia in order to “study the commercial 
situation” of the country (ibid. p. 34). Several Finnish companies from the paper and 
coffee industry as well as the Chamber of Commerce also expressed their interest in 
supporting Mr. Alhanko in this task. 
  
Pentti Pajari, the Finnish representative of FEDECAFE wrote him a letter of 
recommendation. The Pajari family had a longstanding connection to Colombia after 
Vilho Pajari, a sailor, travelled there in the 1920’s upon a suggestion from his brother 
Pentti in order to find products to sell in Finland and brought back sacks of coffee to 
be sold on the Finnish markets.33 The family started a company called Colombian 
Kahvi Oy and had several coffee houses in Helsinki. During his travels Vilho Pajari had 
made contact with FEDECAFE and through this contact Colombian Kahvi became the 
representative of FEDECAFE in Finland and the Pajaris a family in which the title of 
Honorary Consul of Colombia has been passed down to next generations (Pajari, 
2018). Alhanko arrived in Colombia in 1947 apparently as the first representative of the 
Finnish Ministry in the country.  
  
According to the research conducted by Alhanko at the time, 85% of all Colombian 
exports were coffee and this was also Finland’s main product of interest, especially 
because there was a growing demand for coffee in the country.34 In the late 1940’s 
and early 1950’s Colombia coffee industry was undergoing a structural reform and 
expansion during which transport facilities were improved in order to transport the 
harvest to the cities and direct and indirect government financing as well as fixed priced 
for exports by FEDECAFE helped to boost the industry further. Colombia’s national 
                                                                
33 Coffee was already a demanded product in Finland in the 1920 as the nation had had high levels of 
coffee consumptions all the way from the early 19th century (Forsius, 1993). For more information 
about history of Finnish coffee consumption see for example Koivisto, 2012. 
34 Its use had been regulated during the War with food cupongs and the first coffee load after the war 
had arrived in Finland on the 1946. The regulating lasted until 1954 (Linninlä et al., 1992, p. 187) 
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development in the 1950’s, the country’s industrialization and urbanization, can in fact 
be linked to this coffee boom as it created the first proper transport network and 
improved the economic situation in the countryside (Steiner & Vallejo, 2010, p. 145). 
In fact, by 1960’s Colombia produced a considerable surplus of coffee and FEDECAFE 
was looking for new selling regions (Hunter, 1962, p. 43). This created a good 
economic opportunity for the two countries, as one was looking to increase its coffee 
purchases and the other had increasing quantities of good quality surplus product to 
sell. 
  
When Alhanko arrived in Bogotá there was no official or commercial representation. 
However, there were individuals such as Pertti Pajari and Erkki Mikkola35 who had 
business connections with FEDECAFE and perhaps partly because of these individual 
connections FEDECAFE gave Finland a loan worth of 4 million dollars for coffee 
purchases in 1948 (Alhanko, 2009, p. 83). According to Alhanko, the biggest hindrance 
for the commercial relations for both countries was the lack of currency and because 
of this, an agreement on bilateral trade36 was signed in 1949. This agreement allowed 
Finland to buy large quantities of coffee during the next years which were paid in paper 
and carton. Even though Colombia required import licenses on paper products, those 
buying from Finland were exempt from this requirement which greatly facilitated the 
acquirement of new buyers in the regulated market (ibid. p. 83-86). Later in 1953 the 
Finnish imports expanded from paper products to cellulose and metal and chemical 
industry as the amounts of coffee purchased demanded more products as payment 
than solely the paper industry could provide (ibid., p. 87 & 244). The new products 
included ships, machines, trucks and even ready built wooden houses, which were 
constructed to Cartagena and Barranquilla on the Caribbean coast (ibid. p. 90 & 244) 
  
The bilateral trade agreement was valid until the end of 1967 and the trade grew “on a 
steady pace” during the 1950’s and the early years of 1960s (ibid.) despite Colombia 
                                                                
35 Mikkola had worked as the representative of FINNCELL, the organisation of Finnish cellulose 
producers in Argentina as well as in the Finnish Embassy in Washington, which was in charge affairs 
with most of Latin America at the time. 
36 Barter trade between two sovereign countries which does not require hard currency as the goods 
are paid in goods. Bilateral trade was popular in Finland’s business circles as it was the form of trade 
preferred by and used with Soviet Union, Finland’s biggest trade partner, at the time. See e.g. Laurila 
1995 
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going through a ten-year civil war between the Liberal and Conservative parties.37 In 
order to end the civil war, the army took power and Colombia was under the military 
rule of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla from 1953 onwards. This is the only occasion of non-civil 
rule in the Colombian history and is generally considered to be time of great economic 
and social progress despite the fact that the armed conflict kept raging on in the 
countryside. However, Rojas Pinilla’s rule was also marked by censorship and political 
persecution of the left-wing politicians and especially the communists. The rule of 
Rojas Pinilla came to an end after the general strike in 1957, after which democratic 
rule was restored the following year. The two parties declared a power sharing 
agreement called “Frente Nacional” for the next 16 years, during which the presidency 
was altered between the representatives of each party ensuring a more peaceful 
political environment. With this development, the power was left in the hands of the 
political elite with little interest in the grievances of the masses, but a further armed 
conflict was evaded (Valtonen, 2001, p. 364-65).   
 
5.2 1960: Bilateral trade and social developments   
   
As Pakkasvirta and Aronen (1998, p. 10-12) show, Finland’s general interest towards 
Latin America grew in many different sectors in the 1960’s. This was also the case with 
Colombia, no doubt aided by the blossoming new bilateral trade relationship. The 
Embassy in charge of Colombia had been the Finnish Mission in Washington, but when 
Finland opened its Embassy to Peru in 1963, the Colombian affairs were transferred 
under its jurisdiction. This year also saw a first Ministerial visit between the countries 
when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Olavi Mattila, visited Bogotá in 
November. 
  
According to a report written in Lima from the “Embassy of Finland in Bogota” and sent 
in February 1963 (UM, 1/63), the trade relationship between Finland and Colombia had 
greatly progressed in the previous years as the Finns had increased their purchase of 
coffee. The report also mentions an increasing Colombian interest towards Finnish 
products, but because of the cumbersome system of approving import licences in the 
                                                                
37 La Violencia or the Violence started in 1948 with the murder of Liberal politician Jorge Elier Gaitan 
in Bogotá provoking riots called el Bogotazo in the capital. This violence spiralled into a conflict 
between the militant groups of the two parties, claiming the life of almost 200 000 people and 
displacing 1 000 000 around the country during the next 10 years (Hunter, 1962, p. 15). 
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Colombian end, the trade was unbalanced and unfavourable for Finland by almost 5 
million dollars. There was some interest from the Colombian political leaders to 
balance the situation and more licenses were to be granted in the coming years. 
However, by 1965 the imports from most countries had been halted almost completely 
as Colombia introduced a strong currency control and set further import licenses on all 
products in order to maintain the Colombian peso more stable when Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo assumed the presidency in 1966. 
  
In 1967, in a letter sent to the trade department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry Consul 
Alhanko stated, that the reason for the unbalanced trade was that 
  
“Colombia’s positive economic development has not been as brisk as expected 
and [...] production and consumption have not increased as expected meaning 
that raw materials and semi processed products (paper and carton) have not 
been imported from Finland as much as was estimated or licenses have been 
granted also for other countries than Finland because of pressure from United 
States and international monetary funds as part of the so called Plan Vallejo38” 
(Alhanko, 2009, p. 318)39 
  
The Colombian trade with other countries, such as Spain and West Germany, was 
equally unbalanced as: 
  
“even though Colombia continuously express its interest to prefer bilateral 
agreements [...] it knows it is too depended on the support of United States and 
international monetary funds and cannot act fully against their instructions”40 
(ibid. p. 319). 
  
                                                                
38 The Vallejo Plan was the formulation of Colombian economic policy that allowed the entry of raw 
materials, inputs and capital goods, free of customs duties, in exchange for equivalent exports. United 
States was granted several licenses in exchange for AID-loans in 1967 
39 “Colombian [sic] taloudellinen kehitys ei ole ollut niin nopea ja suotuisa [...] joten tuotanto ja kulutus 
eivät ole kasvaneet odotetusti, mistä johtuen raaka-aineita ja puolivalmisteita (paperi ja kartonki), ei 
ole maahantuotu Suomesta niin paljon kuin on arvioitu, tai niille on ryhdytty myöntämään lisenssejä 
muistakin maista kuin Suomesta, lähinnä Yhdysvaltojen ja kansainvälisten rahastojen painostuksesta 
ns. Plan Vallejon puitteissa.” 
40 “Vaikka Colombia [sic] jatkuvasti ilmoittaa haluavansa suosia bilateraalisopimuksia […] se tietää 
olevansa liiaksi riippuvainen Yhdysvaltojen ja kansainvälisten rahastojen tuesta, eikä voi menetellä 
täysin niiden ohjeita vastaan.” 
27 
 
Despite of this economic policy, the foreign policy of Lleras intended to shift the 
Colombian focus towards its neighbours, especially Venezuela and Ecuador, as well 
as other countries further away in order to diversify the international relations and thus 
fortify Colombia’s position in the international community in general.41 The new foreign 
policy was on a Respice Similia principle, in contrast with the previous Respice Polum 
in which Colombia’s main focus had been the relations with the United States of 
America (Dallanegra Pedraza). However, it could be speculated that this policy was 
aimed towards decreasing the power of the US in the continent and thus pressuring it 
to give more aid to developing countries such as Colombia. In 1967 president Lleras 
expressed his wish to continue the fruitful trade relations with Finland despite the fact 
the bilateral trade agreement came to an end (UM, R-24/5, 1976).  Finland set up three 
commercial representations for Colombia in 1967 but they were unsuccessful in 
advancing the trade in any meaningful way (UM, I/77). Alhanko also stated that the 
Finnish exports started to suffer from 1968 onwards, despite the fact attempts of 
restructuring the export policies during the next decades (Alhanko, 2009, p. 148-9). 
  
It is worth noting that in 1967, Colombian manufacturing sector was experiencing 
inefficiencies which were attributed to financial problems as well as to the import 
substitution industrialization.42 Because of this Colombia changed its economic policy 
towards exports promotion with hopes that opening of the economy would foster great 
competition abroad and thus more efficient economic manufacturing sector. This made 
the export manufacturing, meaning mainly coffee and somewhat oil in the Colombian 
context, the fastest growing sector (US Library of Congress). This had a major impact 
also in the Finnish-Colombian relations as can be seen further on as the government 
concentrated funds to agricultural sector instead of industrial development. 
  
The 1960’s were socially very different decades in Colombia and Finland. In Finland 
the left-wing parties won the parliamentary elections in 1966 and the creation of welfare 
state became the Government's political goal. The next governments made significant 
social reforms, such as basic education act in 1968, family pensions to guarantee 
                                                                
41 Colombia’s exports to neighbouring countries constituted less than 1% of the Colombian exports in 
1958 (Hunter, 1962, p. 107). 
42 Import substitution industrialization or ISI was an economic and development policy, largely applied 
in the Latin America from 1950 to 1980, which aimed to reduce foreign dependency through local 
production of the industrialized products. 
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economic help for low income families and subsidies for medical expenses from the 
social security funds. 
  
Meanwhile in Colombia the decade following the bloody civil war saw the creation of 
the leftist guerrilla groups FARC, ELN and M-19. Colombia was a hugely unequal 
society with the elite educating their children abroad whilst 37,7% of the population 
over 15-year-old was illiterate (this number rising to 50% in rural areas) in 195843 and 
over a million children annually were left without any education (Hunter, 1962 p. 20-
21). Paternalism was widespread, and companies stepped in providing their workers 
social benefits such as housing and subsidized products when the government did not 
(ibid., p. 33-4). In the turn of the decade, the country was still divided into 
latifundias (large estates) and minifundias, which Hunter (1962, p. 12) defines as 
“estates too small to support the owners or renters” and there was some considerable 
pressure for land reform (ibid., p. 42). In 1961, due to the government starting an 
Accelerated Economic Development programme which subsidized the large industrial 
farmers on expense of small-scale farmers in order to bring economic development to 
the rural areas some 40 000 families were left landless. Meanwhile, because of the 
century’s old traditions of inequality, movements that looked towards Cuba and the 
“common man’s” revolution of Fidel Castro had also emerged in Colombia (ibid., p. 
44). As a response to this government’s “reversed landform” of the Accelerate 
Economic Development programme, militants residing in the countryside who had 
fought during the Violence for the Liberal party and since switched their political 
orientation to communism, declared independence for rural areas of Tolima in 1964. 
The Government’s answer to this was military force. After a severe military attack, 48 
men escaped to the mountains, amongst them Marulanda Veléz, Tirofijo44 and other 
members of the Colombian Communist Party, and founded FARC, Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). This was a 
military organization to bring together several different communist groups in order to 
fight against the rightist government for a more equal land distribution. Around the 
same time other leftist guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército 
de Liberación Nacional or ELN), Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de 
Liberación or EPL) and, a few years later, el Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19) were also 
                                                                
43 In comparison, this number was below 5% in Finland in 1960 (Myllyntaus, 1991). 
44 Who later became known as a significant leader in FARC-EP. 
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formed in different parts of the country. This marked the start of the most recent 
intrastate conflict in Colombia which was to last for over 50 years. 
 
5.3 1970: Hopes for business and Presidential visits 
  
The Colombian coffee industry grew rapidly during the late 1970’s (Palacios, 2006, p. 
223) and in 1977 the trade remained unbalanced because of Finland’s large coffee 
purchases. The “coffee politics” were extremely important to Colombia’s economic 
development as well as foreign politics and, because of this, the coffee federation 
funded the Finnish imports by 80% through currency compensation making it easier 
for Finnish products to enter the market. Despite of this, the Finnish officials found it 
frustrating that Colombia did not grant more import licenses and thus hindered the 
Finnish possibilities for exporting products (UM, I/77). 
  
In the years of 1970’s Colombia moved away from protectionism and started to liberate 
its trade agreements and created a uniform import licensing system in which products 
were classified in two groups: to those which could be traded freely and those which 
needed a licence. Following the larger global economic trend at the time, Colombia 
also joined the 1975 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1975 and 
again in 1980.  
  
In other foreign policy matters, Finland raised its profile in the 1970’s. The third stage 
of the high summit of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe organized 
in 1975 in Helsinki brought Finland to international attention. It was the first meeting 
where the leaders of Soviet Union and United States met each other after the start of 
the Cold War. 35 countries have signed the Helsinki Act which resulted from the high-
level meeting and the OSCE summit is widely held as the crown jewel of the Finnish 
diplomacy and foreign policy (Mäntyvaara, 2016 p. 112). A former secretary of state 
Jukka Valtasaari has stated that this period, starting from the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks from 1969 till OSCE in 1975, was the golden age for Finland in the international 
community, during which it was said to “fight in the league above its own weight class”45 
(ibid., p. 260). 
                                                                
45 “Suomesta sanottiin, että se otteli painoaan korkeammassa luokassa.” (iiii, p. 259-60). 
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In 1977 Finland fortified its representation in Colombia with a commercial secretary 
and made plans to appoint a chargé d’affaires to further improve the economic relations 
(UM, I/77). Because of the failure of the Brazilian coffee crops, Finland had increased 
its coffee purchases from Colombia in the previous year and the Finnish officials felt 
that the trade balance was thus “completely unacceptable” (ibid.) However, during the 
late 1970’s, Colombia was granting more import licenses as previously mentioned and 
the country had large currency reserves. The Finns had also negotiated “better funding 
benefits to Finland than any other country”46 in order to make up for the imbalanced 
trade (ibid.). The Finnish officials felt, that this opportunity could be best taken 
advantage of by setting up stronger representation in Bogotá in order to look after the 
Finnish economic interests. Equally, there were hopes that Finland could participate in 
many upcoming development programmes in the country and provide machinery for 
road building, wood refining and transportation (ibid.) 
  
The Colombian foreign trade policy saw significant changes during the presidency of 
Alfonso López Michelsen 1974-1978. He believed that the previous economic policy 
of focusing heavily on the industrialization of the country was harming the 
competitiveness of the economy. He believed that liberalizing foreign trade and the 
financial sector as well as privatization of state enterprises was the way of making 
Colombia “the Japan of South America”47 (Palacios, 2006, p. 195). However, Lopez’s 
regime failed to do much more for the economic liberalization because of the political 
weight of the industrialization in the country (ibid., p. 196) but his follower, Julio Cesár 
Turbay Ayala, who assumed the presidency in 1978, continued on the road of 
economic opening. He also created extensive social programme known as Programa 
Nacional de Integracion (PIN) which can be considered quite effective and 
redistributive (ibid., p. 198). This programme also represented the early mentioned 
hopes for business opportunities for the Finns. 
  
                                                                
46 “Kun Kolumbia antaa Suomelle ehdotuksestamme paremmat rahoitusedut kuin kenellekään muulle 
maalle” (UM, I/77) 
47 On another less flattering note it can also be stated that his government created the base for the 
laundering of drug money as the National Bank of Colombia create a mechanism which permitted the 
free exchange of dollars to pesos without the necessity to declare the origin of the funds (Cuevas, 
1991) 
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In May 1978 a Finnish delegation, led by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Eero 
Rantala visited Colombia. As part of this delegation some of the “most important 
economic and industrial leaders” (UM, 16/1-79) visited the country. As tended to be 
the recurring theme in the Finno-Colombian trade relations, the Finnish delegation 
draw attention to the imbalance of trade and the Ministers from both countries signed 
a note recognising its existence (ibid). However, Risto Veltheim, who acted as the 
secretary of the delegation, has since stated that the visit of the delegation “did not 
lead to any concrete results [as] the Colombians knew that the coffee was bought by 
roasteries, not the state and that the colombian mild-variety was the absolute favourite 
of the Finnish coffee drinkers”48 (Veltheim, 2016, p. 301). 
  
In 1979 the Finno-Colombian relationships reached their peak, as president Turbay 
Ayala visited Finland on an unofficial visit on his way to Soviet Union. This visit was 
due to a personal invitation of Erkki Alhanko, who had been extraordinarily active in 
creating relationships with the leading Colombian politicians (Alhanko, 2007, p. 208). 
During his visit the Colombian leader was received by the Prime Minister Mauno 
Koivisto in a night reception (Pajari, 2018) as well as for a lunch in the Presidential 
Palace by the President Urho Kekkonen. During the lunch, the Presidents discussed 
the bilateral relations and Kekkonen praised Colombia as “a great Latin American 
democracy which fights strongly for its economic development after having secured its 
democratic institutions”49. In the private meeting the Presidents negotiated the creation 
of a mixed commission for further investigating the possibilities for cooperation and 
bilateral trade and a creation of Agreement on Cooperation in Economic, Industrial and 
Technical matters (EIT) (Turbay Alaya, 1979 p. 130). 
  
According to the Finnish sources, the suggestion for the commission came from the 
Colombian President and the Finns felt that “despite of its distant location, Colombia 
can be seen as potential country for imports” (UM 1/9-79) and the suggestion was 
approved. According to the Foreign Ministry’s documents, the Finnish side hoped to 
include professional know-how about forest industry and education to the agreement 
                                                                
48 “[...] ei se mihinkään konkreettiseen tulokseen johtanut. Kolumbialaiset tiesivät, että kahvin ostavat 
paahtamot eikä valtio ja että colombian mild -laatu oli suomalaisten kahvinjuojien ehdoton suosikki.” 
(Veltheim, 2016, p. 301) 
49 “La gran democracia latinoamericana que lucha esforzadamente por su desarrollo económico, 
después de haber afianzado sus instituciones democráticas” (Turbay Alaya, 1979, p. 130) 
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(ibid). The Finns were also reluctant to sign an agreement that would not address the 
imbalance of trade directly (UM, 33/292, 1979). The Colombian view on the 
disproportionate trade was that the “[Finnish] exporters had not demonstrated sufficient 
capacity to penetrate to the Colombian market”50 (Turbay Alaya, 1979 p. 130). 
  
It is worth noting, that during the same year Finland was also engaged in negotiation 
about a similar agreement with Argentina. In order to start the negotiation with 
Colombia, the first meeting of the commission was held in Bogota in November 1979 
after which the agreement was initiated. 
  
In an agreement, both countries agreed that the trade had been growing in a 
satisfactory manner, even though it had been imbalanced since 1969 in a way which 
profited Colombia. Both countries agreed that the trade, which stood at 35 million 
dollars for the first half of 1979, did not reflect its real potential. The Colombians 
expressed their wish to find manners to increase the Finnish imports to the country and 
suggested special import licenses that could be granted to Finnish products on top of 
the generally lowered customs. This could be seen as part of the general Colombian 
policy to move towards free trade after decades of protectionism. As coffee formed 
90% of the Colombian exports to Finland, its importance was also underlined in the 
agreement. Both sides agreed that it was desirable that the Finnish coffee purchases 
would continue and increase in the future (UM, 33/292, 1979). 
 
The reality, however was going to be somewhat different. As a result of Colombia 
signing the GATT, by 1980, only 56% of the imports were subject to licensing. 
However, the opening of the trade had led to unfavourable economic developments 
the licence requirements were further expanded (UM, 33/1983).  This meant that, the 
Colombian trade relationship with several countries remained unbalanced. The Finnish 
delegation felt that the economic opportunities were further hindered by the fact that 
Colombia had trade agreements with Spain and several socialist states which required 
it to balance the trade by buying products from those countries. Trade agreements of 
this sort did not exist between Finland and Colombia (ibid.) 
 
                                                                
50 [...] todavía los exportadores de su país no han mostrado suficiente capacidad para penetrar en el 
mercado colombiano.” (ibid.) 
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5.4 1980: The years of political change and opening the embassies 
  
In Finland in the start of the 1980’s saw an enormous political shift in Finland as 
President Urho Kekkonen, who had governed Finland in a formally parliamentary 
system which was, in reality, heavily tilted towards the President51 for almost three 
decades, renounced his presidency due to health concerns in 1981. The acting Prime 
Minister, Mauno Koivisto, was elected as the 9th President of the Finnish Republic by 
the decision of electoral college in 1982. He continued his predecessor’s foreign policy 
until the collapse of the Soviet Union,52 but also transformed the Finnish political 
system to a more parliamentary direction by giving up many presidential powers in 
favour of the Prime Minister as well as reduced the significance of the President in the 
country’s foreign politics (Volanen, 2016, p.  466). This created a new style of stability 
in the Finnish politics in which governments were able to serve their full term and 
possibilities for long term political planning improved greatly (Miettunen, 2017).   
  
Meanwhile, economically Finland was living a boom in the 1980’s. The foreign credit, 
which was previously regulated by the Finnish Bank, was liberated in 1986. This led to 
rapid economic growth but also large-scale company indebtment from foreign lenders 
and eventually the overheating of the economy53 (Taloustieto). During the years of 
growth many Finnish companies created fusions together and with foreign companies 
thus expanding their operations abroad. 
  
In Colombia, the late 1970’s had seen the rise of the drug trade, but in the start of the 
1980’s the apparition of cocaine refined it to the form which has since played a marking 
role in all sectors of the Colombian society and politics. In the beginning of the decade 
cocaine rose to replace cannabis as the illicit crop of choice for the drug dealers of the 
                                                                
51 Kekkonen was re-elected four times between 1956 and 1981, once by term extensions by 
emergency law instead of elections. His was able to use his personal relationship with Soviet Union as 
a strong motivation to keep him in power as there were fears of aggressive politics from the Soviet 
side, which could threaten the Finnish independence and it was believed Kekkonen could manage this 
threat (see e.g. Vihavainen et al, 2017 or the biography of Urho Kekkonen series by Juhani Suomi). 
52 Mainly meaning the so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine which aimed to keep Finland as an 
independent sovereign, democratic and capitalist country through “active neutrality” in foreign affairs 
but also with emphasized friendship with the Soviet Union (see e.g. Suomalainen & Okker, 1974 or 
Väyrynen, 2016 p. 425). 
53 Because of the new loans from abroad the money circulating in the national system rose rapidly 
which in turn increased the price of apartments and business properties creating a real estate and 
stock market bubble as well as large fortunes, based on loaned money. This often referred to as 
“casino economy” or kasinotalous in Finnish 
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region.54 The drug mafias in Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia had already been 
born in the late 1970’s because of the increasing consumption of cocaine especially in 
the United States, and these activities found fertile ground in Colombia thanks to the 
long-standing business traditions of smuggling contraband and tax evasion (Palacios, 
2006, p. 204). There was also an already-in-place-infrastructure to transport the 
product to United States in some regions, thanks to the bonanza marimbera (Semana, 
1982). These tendencies facilitated the spread of drug trafficking as a potential 
business opportunity, which ended encompassing all social classes and thousands of 
people in organized networks, which were, of course, controlled by powerful cartels 
(Palacios, 2006, p. 242).  In the 1982 Colombia was already a significant producer of 
cocaine to the global markets and its market share was greatly increased by ambitious 
businessmen especially from Medellin and Cali, such as Pablo Escobar. 
  
Cartel leaders such as Escobar viewed themselves largely as respectable 
businessmen and sought political influence on top of economic success by trying to 
legitimate the drug business. They also invested money in large social projects and 
became esteemed characters in their communities where the source of their richness 
was largely not known (Entel, 2009). Their growing influence did provoke some 
opposition from politicians, but many adopted a permissive stand to the drug traffickers’ 
money and influence (Palacios, 2006, p. 204). As Turbay’s regime focused on the 
foreign trade liberalization as well as new social programmes, it also had a negative 
impact on the country’s security situation and drug trafficking issues. The policies of 
economic liberalization meant that it was also easier for the drug money to enter 
Colombia (ibid., p. 199). 
  
The cartels, however were not the only ones taking advantage of the economic 
opportunities of the drug trade. The guerrilla organisations also saw an opportunity to 
fund their struggle and got increasingly involved in the coca production, this, in part 
then, fuelled the increase of guerrilla activities in the country. The result of this was the 
changing nature of the Colombian guerrilla warfare, as well as ever increasing human 
                                                                
54 The bonanza marimbera or “marijuana bonanza” had started in the mid 1975 when North Americans 
discovered that high quality marijuana could be produced in the Caribbean region of Colombia, thus 
creating the drug industry in the country. It is estimated that up to 300 000 families turned to cannabis 
production in the 1970’s and in 1978 90% of the cannabis consumed in the United States came from 
Colombia (Semana, 1982). 
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right concerns: as the cocaine and ransoming oil companies became the major source 
of income for FARC and ELN (Gaqueta, 2003 s. 76) it boosted the organizations’ 
economic resources and thus appeal especially amongst the marginalized youth. 
Simultaneously, as the organizations grew in power, the Colombian government 
deployed harsher means in combating their activities. In Amnesty International’s 
reports from 1980 there were accounts of 50 different forms of torture and some six 
hundred cases of military abuses (Palacios, 2006, p. 198). Turbay’s government also 
faced another international image problem when it broke off relations with Cuba in 
1981 following the discovery that the Cuban regime had offered military training to the 
Colombian guerrilla fighters (ibid., p. 199). 
  
Belisario Betancur Cuartas, elected as president in 1982, sought to relive the growing 
international tension by shifting focus from the Cold War aspects of the Colombian 
foreign policy to more domestic matters and concentrate especially on decreasing the 
guerrilla activities. Betancur’s means of doing this was formulating an amnesty and 
pardon programme for guerrillas who gave up arms or, in other words, a “democratic 
opening” after the repressive years of Turbay’s government. The policy was fairly 
effective in creating a ceasefire with FARC in 1982, but unfortunately this truce did not 
last: in the end only 10% of FARC’s troops demobilized and this was followed by a 
violent backlash from the paramilitary troops55 against the members of political wing of 
the movement, Unión Patriotica, in the following years (Guáqueta, 2003, p. 76). As this 
violent counter reaction demonstrated, the policy of peace proved increasingly 
complicated, not just because of external pressure from the United States which 
demanded for stronger measures against the drug trafficking, but also because of the 
strong opposition from domestic press, business leaders, political class as well as the 
military (ibid., 201). In order to demonstrate to the leftist guerrillas that the government 
was leaving the polarized Cold War orientation behind, Betancur brought Colombia to 
a closer alignment with the Nonaligned countries, but this also proved extremely 
unpopular at home (ibid., p. 206). Additionally, FARC interpreted the attacks against 
its members as a violation of the ceasefire causing the armed conflict to continue and 
intensify further in the years to come. 
  
                                                                
55 See p. 54 
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5.4.1 Opening of the Embassies 
  
If the internal politics of Colombia were turbulent at the start of the decade, in the 
Finnish-Colombian relations a significant step was taken when the EIT Agreement was 
signed in Bogota in front of TV cameras in 1980 and ratified in 1981. In his note from 
1981 the Finnish Ambassador in Lima, accredited to Colombia, Seppo Pietinen 
expressed how friendly the relations between the two countries were and that a 
ministerial visit was agreed for the same year (UM 13/2-81). The vice-President of 
Colombia, Víctor Mosquera Chaux stated that his country was very interested in 
improving its relations with small democratic countries, such as Finland because 
Colombia was going through a period of strong democratic development (ibid.). 
Ambassador Pietinen agreed that Finland also wished to advance the relationship 
between the two countries and that Colombia was known in all parts of the country 
from its excellent coffee (ibid.). In his note Pietinen also marks that: 
  
Even if one peels off the abundant South-American froth from the surface, the 
Colombians [really] do feel certain sympathy towards our country. [...] The trade 
imbalance has been noted on an influential level and our role as a significant coffee 
purchaser gives us the possibility to develop the trade relations in a more balanced 
way on an expense of the vice of the Finnish people - the coffee drinking56 (UM 
13/2-81, p. 4). 
  
Later in 1981 the Minister of Foreign trade, Esko Rekola, visited Colombia with his 
delegation meeting with President Turbay who was pleased to remember his time 
spent in Finland (UM 21/4-81). Finland was interested in finding ways to balance the 
trade, but also to “explore opportunities to profit from Colombia’s coal reserves 
because of the changed situation in Poland” (ibid). The delegation received a “heartfelt 
welcome” and many Colombians indicated that Colombia was looking to diversify its 
economic relations especially to the direction of the Nordic countries; Finland was seen 
as a prime candidate because of its “desire for independence, wise foreign policy and 
                                                                
56 “[...] että vaikka runsas eteläamerikkalainen pintavaahto kuoritaan lausumista pois, maatamme 
kohtaan tunnetaan Kolumbiassa määrättyä sympatiaa. [...] kauppamme epätasapaino on tiedostettu 
vaikutustasolla, ja merkittävä asiakasroolimme kahvin ostajana antaa meille mahdollisuuden 
taloudellisten suhteiden kehittämiseen tasapainoisempaan suuntaan Suomen kansan paheen - 
kahvinjuonnin - kustannuksella.” (UM 13/2-81, p. 4) 
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advanced technology” (ibid.). Ambassador Pietinen does note however, that: “It is, 
however, a different - and quite laborious - task to transform these comments into 
concrete economic cooperation”57  (ibid.). It seems that Ambassador Pietinen was 
correct in this statement, as the active Colombian foreign policy had its focus firmly in 
its own geopolitical region in the coming years (UM, 20/1-82). 
  
In 1981 Colombia was the second most important trade partner for Finland in Latin 
America, after Brazil and 39% of all Finnish coffee imports came from Colombia. 
Finland was mainly exporting products of the wood processing industry as well as 
some chemical products (Alhanko, 2009, p. 135) The positive economic developments 
meant that Finland had increased interests in having representation in Colombia and, 
as Colombia had previously manifested its interest to fortify its own commercial 
representation in Finland through opening an Embassy, 58  in 1981 the Finnish 
government announced its plans to open an independent mission to Bogota. Colombia 
reciprocated the gesture and both countries opened their embassies in the following 
year. Erkki Pajari59, a career diplomat, was named as the Ambassador of Finland in 
Bogota to his first ambassador position and Alfonso Venegas Leyva, also a career 
diplomat, was named Chargé d’Affaires a.i. in Helsinki (Koskela et al. 2016, p. 86). 
  
In his first report from the newly founded Embassy Pajari stated that, for some reason 
or another, he found the establishing of the Finnish Embassy very difficult. He also 
noted that despite the “apparently democratic system a very significant portion of the 
population is left completely out of the political life”60. To the Finnish ambassador, the 
Colombian foreign orientation seemed “of low profile and without a coherent foreign 
policy [with] the focal points of activity mostly on the immediate surrounding; Andean 
group, Organization of American States and Caribbean region”61. Pajari also described 
that the strong legalistic thinking in the internal affairs was also reflected on the 
                                                                
57 “Lienee kuitenkin jo toinen ja varsin työteliäs tehtävä näiden lausuntojen muuntamisessa 
konkreettiseksi taloudelliseksi yhteistyöksi.” UM 21/4-81 
58 Colombia had already presented the idea of opening the Embassies in the 1970’s as it was felt that 
managing the Nordic affairs from London was cumbersome as the economic activity increased in the 
Nordic countries (Koskela, Lahe & Ridanpää, 2016, p. 86) 
59 No relation to the Honorary consuls of Colombia in Finland. 
60 “[...] sinänsä demokraattisesta järjestelmästä huolimatta hyvin suuri kansanosa jää kokonaan 
poliittisen elämän ulkopuolelle” (UM/20.9.1982) 
61 “Kolumbian ulkopoliittinen profiili on melkoisen matala, ja että mitään erityisempää johdonmukaista 
linjaa ulkopolitiikan alalta on vaikea löytää. Aktiviteetin painopisteet ovat lähiympäristössä: ns. Andien 
ryhmä, Amerikan valtioitten [sic] järjestö ja Karibian alue koetaan tärkeinä.” (UM/20.9.1982) 
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country’s foreign policy. The ambassador also stated that there was “a lot of “loose” 
currency in the country as a result of drug exports and this kept the exchange of peso 
lower on the black market than it was according to the official exchange rates”62 
(UM/20.9.1982) The impact of the drug trade on the Colombian economy was thus 
evident to the Finnish representation right from the start of the mission. 
  
From his part, in a report made by Colombian Chargé d’Affaires Venegas in 1983, he 
mentions that the government of Colombia set as his first task the improvement of the 
commercial relationship between Colombia and Finland. He expressed his interest to 
find out about the Finnish views on the obstacles hindering the trade as well as the 
interests in investments and joint ventures (UM/14.9.83). The Finnish government 
responded his enquiry by stating that: 
  
“commercial activity had suffered from the strict import licensing and the 
required procedures [which] have caused substantial delays in delivery of some 
[...] products to Colombia. The relatively high level of certain custom duties, as 
well as import deposits, are regarded to form a barrier to trade. Moreover, 
bilateral agreement with some countries onaboloshing [sic] the import deposits 
have decreased the competitiveness of Finnish exports.” (UM 1982/7.7.83) 
  
Even though the Colombians had assured Finland about their special status in the 
trade markets, the reality was, as stated above, that there were countries which had 
more favourable bilateral agreements, such as United States and Spain. Already in 
1981 Alhanko had in his letter to the Foreign Ministry of Finland, suggested that Finland 
should request “the same benefits as Spain, especially by removing the 35% import 
deposit” (Alhanko, 2009, p. 135). 
  
As stated before, Colombia moved away from easing the import regulation and this 
also affected the bilateral trade with Finland despite the positive step of opening the 
embassies. As the country’s economy started to dwindle in the 1980’s as a result of 
the globally falling coffee prices after the global recession, it experienced balance 
payment problems and in order to save its foreign exchange reserves, the Colombian 
                                                                
62 “Löysää” valuutta on ennätysmäisen huumeviennin ansiosta maassa niin paljon, että peson musta 
kurssi on virallista kurssia alhaisempi. 
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government took steps back from the free trade (US Library of Congress.) It extended 
the licensing requirements and in just three years, some 80% of the products were 
subject to import licenses in 1983. The Finns also noted, that the economic problem 
for the country was not so much the imported products but the low demand of its 
exports (UM/33/83), but nevertheless felt the impact of harsher import regulations 
which also affected their exports. 
  
Even though Finland was the 7th biggest coffee buyer, the countries still did not have 
bilateral agreements which obligated Colombia to buy exports products to balance the 
trade. In the conditions of new trade policy, this significantly complicated the 
exportation of Finnish products to the Colombian markets (UM/33/83). Licenses for 
Finnish products were revoked, denied and reduced and the Finnish representation 
noted that the problem was structural:   
  
“In part we export products which do not fit the current Colombian import policy. 
[...] The leader of Incomex let us know directly that if we found products which 
were now imported from the countries with trade deficit with Colombia 
(mentioned United States and Brazil as such) and which we can offer in 
economically competitive terms, Incomex63 is ready with licensing forbid their 
import from other sources and transfer the purchases to Finland” 64  (UM 
29.8.1983) 
  
In the light of this promise, the Finns judged that it was beneficial to maintain the 
unbalanced trade with Colombia as the “Colombian officials had a completely bilateral 
view on trade deficits and surplus which apparently can be of some benefits in certain 
conditions 65 ”. Because of this, Finland started to scout options for buying other 
Colombian products, apart from coffee (ibid.) Possibilities of opening a credit line66 
                                                                
63 Colombian Institute for Foreign Trade (Instituto Colombino de Comercio Extrerior) 
64 “Viemme osittain tuotteita, jotka eivät sovellu Kolumbian nykyisen tuontipolitiikkaan. [...] Incomexin 
pääjohtaja ilmoitti suoraan, että mikäli löydämme tuotteita, joita nyt tuodaan Kolumbian alijäämämaista 
(mainitsi nimeltä Yhdysvallat ja Brasilian) ja joita voimme tarjota kaupallisesti kilpailukykyisin ehdoin, 
on Incomex valmis lisensoinnilla kieltämään niiden tuonnin muista lähteistä ja siirtämään ostot 
Suomeen.” UM 29.8.1983 
65 “Koska Kolumbian viranomaisilla on ulkomaankauoan [sic] vajeisiin ja ylijäämiin täysin bilateraalinen 
näkemys, josta tietyissä olosuhteissa näköjään saatetaan hyötyäkin” (ibid). 
66 A financial facility allowing the beneficiary to draw down the financial contribution, which can be 
totally or partially reimbursable, in relation to the expenditure paid by the beneficiary and supported by 
receipted invoices or accounting documents of equivalent probative value. 
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from the Finnish trade association to the Banco Cafetero was also discussed 
(UM/7.5.1984). 
  
The mixed commission established in 1981, continued its works to improve the bilateral 
trade and in a round of meetings in Helsinki in 1986 it was noted that “both sides noted 
with satisfaction the favourable development between the two countries” and that 
“opportunities to expand and deepen these mutually beneficial relations were identified 
on both sides” (UM/26.6.1986). Concretely the commission stated the need to diversify 
trade and Finns expressed their hope to find new ways of promoting trade in Colombia. 
The Colombian side assured that widening imports gave better access also to Finnish 
goods and offered their collaboration on the matter.  Colombia also had problems with 
custom duties on its export products to Finland (coffee and flowers) and this was 
agreed on the agenda of next round of GATT meeting. The possibility of expanding the 
coal trade67 from Colombia to Finland was also discussed, as well as several industrial 
projects in Colombia to which Finnish companies had interest in participating. Potential 
industrial cooperation was also identified on forestry and forest industries, energy 
production and distribution, transportation and material handling, agricultural 
machinery, shipbuilding and the health sector (ibid.) 
  
The Finns considered that the trade between the two countries was in a “critical point 
of growth”, as there was a significant increase in imports and exports planned for the 
next two years. This would have let to Colombia assuming the position of Finland’s 
biggest trading partner in Latin America. It was noted that several projects agreed 
during the meetings required close observation by officials familiar with the 
particularities of the bilateral trade between the countries and the role of the embassies 
was thus greatly emphasised (UM 19.3.86). 
  
In October the Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade, Jermu Laine, inaugurated the 
Finnish Technical Days in Bogotá68 (Symposio Finlandia Tecnologica 86), stating in 
his speech that the reason for the imbalance of trade was that “the Finnish technology 
                                                                
67 This was a new product on between the countries, starting from 1983 and already contributing 20% 
of the Colombian exports to Finland in 1986 (UM 24.4.1986) 
68 The theme of the event was ports and their technical requirements, energy and the forest industry 
and it included participation from 23 Finnish companies and 500 Colombian ones 
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was not known well enough in Latin America”.69 This event was the first of its kind, 
organized in order to promote the Finnish exports in South America, and attracted wide 
interest from the Colombian companies (UM 7.10.86). During his visit, Laine also met 
with Alfonso Merino, the Colombian Minister of Development, as part of the first 
meeting on the evaluation of the progress of the mixed commission. A product of this 
meeting was an Act of Economic Bilateral Cooperation. 
  
Colombia was already the third biggest coal importer to Finland at this point after 
Poland and the Soviet Union, but this also meant that the trade imbalance was getting 
worse from the Finnish point of view: from the estimated value of the bilateral trade, 
Finland was responsible for just one fifth (ibid.).70 It should also be stated however, 
that in 1985 Colombia represented just 0,6% of the total imports of Finland and out of 
all the Colombian products imported, coffee continued to be by far the most 
significant.71 Finland was also struggling to introduce new products to the Colombian 
market and only exported the traditional paper and chemical products (UM 21.2.1986). 
In 1987 there were some hopes for a large joint venture between Finland, Soviet Union 
and Colombia to build a ground gas pipe to Colombia and President Barco invited a 
Finnish delegation to Colombia to discuss the project (UM 18.12.1987). For one reason 
or another, the project was never realised. However, there were other industrial 
projects with Finnish company involvement (UM 3.12.1986). 
 
 5.4.2 Spiral of violence intensifies in Colombia 
  
After the mid-80, the security situation in Colombia became critical. A turning point in 
the flourishing drug business and its close connection to the Colombian politics came 
in 1984 when, after increasing pressure from the US government and a fraction headed 
by Luis Carlos Galán in the New Liberal Party, the Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla 
took a strong stand against the drug industry, branding those involved publicly for the 
first time and ordered the destruction one of the Medellin Cartel’s largest laboratories. 
He also brought increasing pressure in order to bring those involved in the illegal 
activities to face the justice in Colombia and in the United States. This stance proved 
                                                                
69 “[...] ettei suomalainen teknologia ole riittävästi tunnettu Latinalaisessa Amerikassa.” (UM 7.10.86) 
70 The value was estimated at 600 million Finnish marks in October 1986 
71 Other imports were bananas, fresh carnations and iron 
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to be fatal as it led to his assassination, making him the only Minister victim of the 
narco-violence (Bushnell, 1993, p. 262). The attack to the Palace of Justice in 1985 by 
the Marxist M-19, which targeted the President but left 25 Supreme Court Justices 
dead, was a clear sign that the country had slid to extraordinary levels of violence 
(Livingston, 2004, p. 55). 
  
As the violence in the cities intensified, the newly elected Liberal president Virgilio 
Barco Vargas recognised in 1986 that poverty and social injustice were in fact the 
biggest obstacle in resolving the country’s issues: one quarter of the population lived 
in extreme poverty and this had a serious effect on the country’s ability for economic 
growth and it also fuelled the conflict and disrupted the democratic institutions 
(Palacios, 2006, p. 209). The national development plan drafted by Barco’s 
government sought to reduce primary school dropout rates, to improve the healthcare 
infrastructure and create national system of child-care centres for working mothers 
from poor neighbourhoods. The government’s plan could be described as “circular” as 
“the effects of poverty were perhaps confused with its causes” and it did not “broach 
the issue of Colombia’s social structure... [which] ...created such widespread poverty” 
(ibid.). 
  
Despite best intended efforts, during Barco’s presidency 1986-1990 the government 
failed to solve the issues fuelling the violence in any significant manner and, as a result, 
the country’s economic development did not reach the hoped levels. Even though the 
Finns had hopes for the reopening of the economy in 1985 (UM 21.2.1986), the 
violence as well as the low price of coffee in the global markets hindered the economic 
growth of the country and thus did not support this kind of economic policy in Colombia. 
The potentially promising oil industry also faced serious issues as the armed groups, 
especially ELN, carried out attacks to the oil export pipelines, which significantly 
reduced the government’s revenues from that industry as well. The attacks on the oil 
lines also created a lucrative business of ransoming foreign companies for their 
workers, making Colombia an even more complicated destination for foreign 
companies and investors (Gaqueta, 2003, p. 85). 
  
The attacks against the oil industry also exaggerated the violence further as it created 
a conflict between the guerrilla groups: ELN and FARC started to combat over the 
43 
 
control of the oil rich territories extending the guerrilla warfare to new territories outside 
the traditional coca producing states and thus worsening the security situations for 
civilians. Whenever the guerrillas gained the control of new areas, they also spread 
the practise of coca cultivation, boosting the production and feeding the ever-growing 
drug trafficking business. The country was suffering then, from widespread urban and 
political violence, which was now even more extreme in the countryside (Palacios, 
2006, p. 211). 
  
As this violence raged the drug trafficking augmented and the drug barons became 
more and more powerful. All attempts from the government's side to control the 
situation had proved insufficient and in 1989 Barco announced a new “peace initiative” 
in which drug trade was recognised as a political issue centred on the policy question 
of extradition, but also separated from political crimes which were contributed for 
“altruistic motives” (Palacios, 2006, p. 211). This distinction mattered, because it put 
the drug lords to different legal and moral category from the guerrillas and the initiative 
had some initial success as the leftist M-19, weakened by the military, agreed to restart 
peace negotiation and finally surrendered its arms in 1990.72 The Maoist EPL also 
made peace with the government in 1991. This development, even if positive, did 
unfortunately little to resolve the issue with the leftist guerrillas as a whole as the 
strongest groups, ELN and FARC did not only stay out of any possible peace 
negotiation but had also combined their forces in the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla 
Coordinating group in 1987. 
 
There was also an amplified response from the right wing to these increasing guerrilla 
activities. As the drug barons had become landowners, they started to create private 
armies in order to protect their property from the guerrillas trying to take control of it. 
These armed groups of civilians worked in close cooperation not only with the drug 
barons, but also with other large landowners, local leaders and the military (Chernick, 
2007). These groups were based on the paramilitary organisations established already 
from the 1960’s onwards as the landowners’ response to the guerrilla movements but 
in the 1980’s the previously limited scope organisations took a new form (Arnson, 2005, 
                                                                
72 Finnish lieutenant colonel Ermei Kanninen participated in the signing of the Peace Agreement as 
part of the delegation of the Socialists International, a worldwide association of socialist and social-
democratic parties (UM 12.7.1990). 
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p. 1-2). This led to an explosion of the violence in the countryside as the paramilitary 
groups and guerrilla battled over control of different areas, leaving civilians not only in 
the midst of the conflict but now also victims of political cleansings.  
 
5.5 1990: Violence and recession affect the relations 
  
The start of the 1990’s saw an economic crisis in Finland.  As mentioned before, the 
debt-based economic boom and speculation lead into the overheating of the economy 
and the bursting of the bubble.  As a result of the collapse of two banks, mutually owned 
central institution SKOP (Säästöpankkien keskusosakepankki) and STS (Suomen 
Työväen Säästöpankki) and interest rate shock which hit the Nordic countries, the 
Government had to interfere in 1992 in order to prevent a credit crunch73 and give 8 
billion Finnish marks (approximately 1,2 billion euros) zero-interest convertible loan to 
Finnish banks as well as establish a Government Guarantee Fund (Valtion 
vakuusrahasto) to support the savings banks (Sandal, p. 86). This development was 
similar in all Nordic countries, but the Finnish crisis was the most severe Nordic 
banking crisis and cost the country roughly 8% of its GNP. The bank crisis was 
accompanied with soaring unemployment rates (from 3 to 16%) and the country fell 
into deep recession (Sandal, p. 83). The effects of this recession were felt all through 
the decade (Taloussanomat, 2000). 
  
To make economic matters more complicated, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
meant the end of the clearing trade agreement and reduction of the Finnish trade with 
its eastern neighbour. On the other hand, this political change did bring new 
possibilities to the Finnish foreign policy. The strict neutrality policy in international 
matters had already started to shift in the late 1980’s as Mihail Gorbachev assumed 
the leadership of the Soviet Union. When visiting Finland in 1989 he assured the 
Finnish Government that the country could decide freely about is membership in the 
European Communities (see e.g. Saukkonen, 2003) and, as a result, Finland became 
a full member later that year. In 1992, The Agreement of Friendship, Understanding 
and Cooperation with the Soviet Union came to its end and Finland was able to shift 
its focus more towards gaining the membership in the European Union. 
                                                                
73 A sudden reduction in the general availability of loans or tightening of the loan conditions 
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In Colombia, the situation of disorder and violence continued in the turn of the decade. 
As the government sought to negotiate with the guerrillas, such option was not 
available in the case of the drug cartels. In 1989 another high profile political 
assassination, that of Luis Carlos Galán - a charismatic leader of New Liberalism and 
one of the favourites in the 1990 presidential elections who had taken strong stances 
against the infiltration of drug cartels to the Colombian politics74 - lead the Barco 
administration to launch an unprecedented attack against the drug barons: 10 000 
persons were arrested in two weeks and 550 properties were confiscated (Palacios, 
2006, p. 212). This operation also brought to light an even clearer picture of how 
extensive and pervasive the links between illegal and legal economies were and how 
difficult it would be to solve the issue with purely military means (ibid). Of course, the 
government's crackdown created a strong counter reaction from the cartels’ leaders 
and the Medellin cartel declared total war stating that it would switch from targeted 
violence against government officials to “burning and destroying the oligarchy 
industries and properties” (ibid). This war came in the form of bomb attacks as well as 
demands of repayment for all the debts amongst the political class. In the “free-fire 
zone” that followed prominent political figures were killed but the government also 
succeeded in eliminating some of the most notorious cartel leaders. In the 1990’s the 
“extraditables” seemed to see the futility of their attempt to overpower the government 
through violence and reiterated their promise to give up trafficking and turn in their 
laboratories and arms if they would get guarantees that they would not be handed over 
to the US authorities but judged in Colombia (Palacios, 2006, p. 213). 
  
In the midst of this, 1990 was also a year for Presidential elections in Colombia and 
the Finnish ambassador Risto Rekola’s report on the matter gives a good image on 
the political situation and violence in the country: 
  
“The [Presidential] campaign has been held in the shadow of an internal political 
crisis [as well as] drug and guerrilla war. Three presidential candidates have 
been murdered. [...] Violence, bomb attacks, murders and kidnapping have 
                                                                
74 César Gaviria Trujillo, an economist by profession who had previously served as a Minister of 
Economy and followed the political footsteps of the assassinated Galán was elected as the new 
president 
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continued. [...] The root cause for the problems are probably in the social 
discontent: inequality and injustice. On the other hand, the power of the drug 
money is incomprehensible. One can buy anything with it, but especially 
services from people starting from politicians to the police and soldiers and 
finishing with the “unemployed” professional killers of the side alleys of 
Medellin.75 
The most incredible thing about this situation is, that the country’s 
economy has not collapsed. It has somewhat suffered but there are no signs of 
recession. The country still pays its debts without delay. There is trade, and 
everything is obtainable”76 (UM 25.5.1990). 
  
According to ambassador emeritus Mikko Pyhälä (2018), it was this worsening cycle 
of violence that lead to the final decision to close the Finnish Embassy in Bogotá two 
years later. In the internal documents of the Ministry, the reason named for the closure 
were budget reasons (UM 25.1.1993). It should also be stated, that there is no doubt 
that the recession that hit the country also played a role and caused Finland to reduce 
the number of its diplomatic missions but there is also little logic in doubting that the 
unstable situation of the country together with the imbalanced trade were the 
fundamental reasons which led to the selection of the Embassy in Colombia to be 
amongst those to be closed. The representation of Finland in Colombia was done from 
Caracas from 1993 onwards. However, it is interesting to note, that these years in the 
early 1990’s are the only ones during which the Colombian Embassy in Finland was 
headed by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Nicolas Salom Franco.77 
                                                                
75 The ambassador is most likely referring to members of the urban youth gangs in the poor 
neighborhoods of Medellin, many of whom were recruited and trained in “hitman schools” by the drug 
cartels (Palacios, 2006, p. 241). 
76 Kamppanja on käyty sisäpoliittisen kriisin, huume - ja sissisodan varjossa. Kolme 
presidenttiehdokasta on murhattu [...] väkivalta, pommi-iskut, murhat ja kidnappaukset ovat jatkuneet 
[...] Ongelmien perussyy lienevät yhteiskunnallisessa tyytymättömyydessä: eriarvoisuudessa ja 
epäoikeudenmukaisuudessa. Toisaalta huumeran voima on käsittämätön. Sillä voi ostaa mitä vain, 
mutta varsinkin ihmisten palveluja poliitikoista poliisista ja sotilaista lähtien aina Medellinin syrjäkatujen 
“työttömiin” ammattitappajiin. 
Ihmeellisintä tässä tilanteessa on, että maan talous ei ole romahtanut. Se on kärsinyt jonkin verran, 
mutta merkkejä lamasta ei ole. Maa maksaa edelleen velkansa ilman viiveitä. Kauppa käy ja kaikkea 
on saatavilla.” (UM 25.5.1990) 
 
77 Salom was most likely a political appointment as was not a career diplomat but a marine biologist 
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His follower, Jose Neira Rey who arrived in 1994 was named Chargé d’Affaires a.i. as 
were all his predecessors (Neyra, 1994, p.11).78  
 
There are little sources on the bilateral relationship between the countries during the 
1990’s despite the fact that Colombia maintained its embassy open in Helsinki until 
2002. The Embassy was headed, as mentioned, by chargé d’affaires instead of 
ambassadors and “suffered from the lack of continuity” (Koskela et al., 2016, p. 
86).  The Chargé d’Affaires a.i., Jose Neira Rey (1994, p. 209), notes that the trade 
deficit was still painfully evident, and that Colombia could have done more in 
promoting institutional and economical rapprochement with Finland. He also states, 
that Finland represented many interesting opportunities for Colombia, especially now 
that the country was on the point of joining the European Union.  However, the Head 
of mission’s ideas on how to realise this operation were largely based on the 
traditional product of choice; coffee (ibid. p. 215).  
 
At the same time, his home country was going through changes in the economic 
structure: by 1990 coffee exports fell from 80% of the country’s total export to just 
20%, being replaced by petroleum derivatives and coal as well as illicit drugs 
(Palacios, 2006, p. 221). Colombia was also going through even larger social 
changes with lowering birth rate, child mortality and illiteracy and growing 
industrialization, GDP and urbanization (ibid., p. 220-26). Whilst millions had 
immigrated outside the country to escape the violence, many also immigrated in the 
cities which changed Colombia’s profile from rural, regionally divided country to one 
with more urban population and strengthened idea of nationhood (ibidi., p. 226). The 
country also passed a new constitution in 1991, which replaced the previous one 
from 1886. This constitution was called the Constitution of Rights and it aimed to be 
more socially inclusive. This mixture of growth, development and extreme violence 
truly made the 1990’s a peculiar decade in Colombia, which could be defined by 
Palacio’s (2006, p. 243) words: “the economy is doing well even though the country 
is doing badly”. 
  
                                                                
78 More on the discussion of why this might be found further along 
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In Finland on the other hand, the former career diplomat Martti Ahtisaari was elected 
as the president of the country recovering from the economic crisis in 1994. Shortly 
after his election, the Finns voted on the membership in the European Union and the 
country joined in 1995. This meant that Finland, the once obsessively neutral country 
tiptoeing the line between the east and the west was now firmly anchored to the 
European community and its policies. Finland also joined European Monetary Union 
and switched its currency to euro. According to former president of Finland, Tarja 
Halonen (Helsingin Sanomat, 2018), on the hindsight one of the biggest changes to 
the Finnish foreign policy that originated from the EU membership - apart from the 
obvious future commitment to the Union’s unified foreign policy - was the ratification of 
the European Convention of Human Rights. At the time, Halonen acted as Foreign 
Minister in the cabinet of President Ahtisaari and created a human rights department 
to the Ministry79 (ibid.). This change would prove to be very significant for the future 
foreign policy of Finland. Finland also lost some of its global importance and the special 
position as a mediator between the east and the west, (which especially Kekkonen and 
somewhat also Koivisto were eager to emphasise) with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. (Mäntyvaara & Pulkkinen, 2016, p. 109) This further emphasized the need for 
a different orientation for the foreign policy. 
  
President Halonen also states that Finland became slightly “near-sighted” about its 
foreign policy, with its eyes firmly fixed on the European issues, after the end of the 
Cold War. This was mainly caused by the fact that Finland joined the European 
Council and later the Union relatively recently in comparison with the other European 
nations (Mäntyvaara & Pulkkinen, 2016, p. 99). This was especially evident during 
the 1990’s and, according to the former Minister for Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen 
(2016 p. 429), Finland’s focus did not truly re-shift to outside its own continent until 
the 2000’s through EU’s development programmes. 
  
The end of the Agreement of Friendship, Understanding and Cooperation with the 
Soviet Union however meant that Finland could also have a more open security 
policy. In 1994 Finland signed a Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO but has 
maintained non-allied. This agreement, together with the EU membership has given 
                                                                
79 In fact, Finland had often been internationally criticized on its human rights stands and juridical 
processes which had been heavily influenced by the Soviet Union (see e.g., Salminen, 1999). 
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Finland the opportunity to participate UN mandate crisis management operations 
both under NATO and EU leadership (YK, 2016). 
  
The EU membership created a somewhat problematic division of tasks in the Finnish 
Foreign Policy, as the president and the government, headed by the Prime Minister 
often had differing ideas on who was ultimately in charge of the Foreign Policy in 
general and represented the country on the highest-level Union meetings.80 This 
situation was created by conflicting legislations which left much room for 
interpretation.81 This so called “problem of two plates” was not fully resolved until the 
new constitution of 2000 was passed. 
  
In Colombia, the foreign policy of president Ernesto Samper, elected in 1994, was 
based on three principles: pacific solutions of conflicts and the policy of non-
intervention, integration with other Latin American countries, especially in the 
Caribbean region and looking for support from foreign investment in order to finance 
social projects at home (Pardo, 1994). However, these principles were not very 
popular with the United States or the neighbouring countries, and they seemed to 
isolate Colombia in its geopolitical region. Neither did they seem to be effective in 
combating the issue of drug trade which was now affecting other countries as well (El 
Tiempo, 6.10.1996). Colombia’s bilateral agenda with United States was mostly 
composed of measures to fight the war against drugs, even though the stands of the 
two countries about the nature of the armed conflict in Colombia were not always 
harmonious (Pardo, 1994).  According to Sanchéz, a Colombian political expert, 
despite the intention towards regional integration, Samper´s Colombia based its 
foreign policy largely on the principles of realism instead of forming strategic alliances 
and because of this, the country’s relationship with the European Union was also 
taking a strain (El Tiempo, 6.10.1996). 
 
Despite their differences in the root cause of the conflict, the Colombian government, 
aided by the US, had been successful in its fight against the drug cartels, but not the 
drug business as such. The illicit trade moved more and more into the hands of the 
                                                                
80 Traditionally the President had been the head of foreign policy and the Foreign Ministry had 
reported directly to the Head of State (Mäntyvaara, 2016, p. 110) 
81 For more detailed explication on the contradictory legislation see Volanen, 2016, p. 467 
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paramilitary and guerrilla groups, thus making them the biggest issue affecting the 
country instead of the “traditional” drug cartels (Leguizamo, 2002, p. 11). When 
running for president, Andres Pastrana sustained negotiations with FARC for 
possible peace process. After he was elected in 1998, FARC agreed to begin the 
formal peace talks, which were then initiated the following year. Even though the first 
year was not very successful, especially because of the lack of decrease in violence 
(Leguizamo, 2002, p. 11), the negotiations were continued, and a new level of 
international participation was added.82  
 
At the end of the decade Finland’s Foreign Ministry’s strategic planning for Latin 
America included the emphasis of the role of the EU as a significant actor in the 
continent alongside the US and the Finnish benefits in commercial and economic 
relations. The political priorities included values relating to stability and democracy, 
as defined in the framework of the EU (Kajaani, 1998, p. 81-81). As stated before, 
the human rights issues had also been elevated to a new importance in the Finnish 
foreign policy planning and this also influenced the Finnish involvement to the peace 
process started by president Andres Pastrana as part of Plan Colombia83.   
 
Pastrana had included peacebuilding as well as human rights to the heart of this 
administration’s foreign policy and normalized the relationship with the European 
Union in 1998 (Cardona, 2001, p. 58). This being the case, the members of the 
Union were keen to form part of the peace process and in 2000 the peace 
negotiations took place in various European countries, including Sweden and 
Norway. Finland was not part of this first round of negotiations but expressed its 
interest to participate in the process (Feodorow, 2001, p. 113) and was included in 
the group of Países amigos y Comisión Facilitadora de las Negociaciones in 2001.  
 
                                                                
82 The mechanism of Facilitator Countries had already been introduced in Colombia in the peace 
negotiations between Samper’s government and the ELN in 1994 (Leguizamo, 2002, p. 10). 
83 Plan Colombia was, as defined by the president; “a set of alternative development projects which 
will channel the shared efforts of multilateral organizations and [foreign] governments towards 
Colombian society” (Pastrana, 2005, p. 48). This meant a sort of “Marshall help plan” to help combat 
the problems caused by cultivation of coca and eventually end the armed conflict. The programme ran 
until 2015 and the foreign financiation came mainly from the US but, when considering the peace 
negotiations, also partly from the European Union. 
51 
 
Even though there was much optimism towards the peace negotiations, the results 
were not what was expected despite various meetings and negotiations facilitated by 
the Foreign Ministry as well as the Iberoamerican Institute of the University of 
Helsinki (Pärssinen, 2006, p. 7). 
 
5.6 2000: New rapprochement 
 
At the start of the new millennia, the former Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen was 
elected as the first female president of Finland. At the same time, on 2000, Finland 
passed the new constitution which further reduced the president’s power and 
strengthened parliamentarism through the position of the Prime Minister. Since 
Halonen’s presidency under the new constitution, one of the four Committees of 
Ministers of the Finnish government is the Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy.84 The Committee meets with the President (who is the head of the meeting) 
and the agenda of the meeting is decided by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister 
and President meet weekly in order to discuss the Foreign Policy matters (and 
attempt to reach an agreement on the issues before the next Committee meeting). 
This means that the preparation of Foreign Policy lays within the responsibility of the 
Foreign Ministry as well as the Office of the Prime Minister, but the final policy is 
decided in cooperation with the President (Volanen, 2016, p. 467-475). 
  
In bilateral and multilateral relationships, the legislation allows room for flexibility. The 
Prime Minister’s role became more established during the early years of 2000 
through Nordic cooperation as well as other bilateral and multilateral meetings. 
Especially Finland’s EU Presidency of 2006 helped to solidify the Prime Minister’s 
position also in the relations with Russia (which had, as stated before, been 
especially connected to the President). This link became even stronger after Vladimir 
Putin stepped down from the Presidency of Russia to serve as the Prime Minister of 
the country from 2008 to 2012 (ibid. p. 473).85  
  
                                                                
84 The others are Committee on European Union Affairs, Ministerial Finance Committee and 
Committee on Economic Policy 
85 It should be noted however, that the President’s position became more established in Finnish 
Foreign Policy after Putin re-assumed the Presidency (ibid. p. 473) 
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In Colombia the start of the new millennia also meant changes to the country’s 
foreign policy if not to the model of governance. Álvaro Uribe Vélez, a highly popular 
but also somewhat controversial candidate,86 was elected as President of Colombia 
in 2002. Uribe “internationalized” the armed conflict in Colombia in a sense that 
seeking associates to fight the enemy effectively became the focus of the foreign 
policy. This has not been the case previously, as the internal conflict had not played 
an important role in the official foreign policy of the country (Rojas, 2006, p. 87). 
Thus, his presidency was characterized by stronger measures against the illegal 
armed groups in the country which also meant focusing the state’s budget more on 
security measures. Already during the Pastrana’s government there had been certain 
“positive narcotization”87 of the Colombian foreign policy which left the other topics 
such as trade and cooperation in the side-lines (Cardona, 2001, p. 56). It seemed 
that the new elected President agreed with the notion that alongside the armed 
conflict, drugs were at the heart of the problem and that the solution could only be 
reached by concentrating the foreign policy efforts to the countries who could help to 
combat them. The international partners in the peace negotiations with FARC came 
to note that in this case as well Uribe's focus was not to continue talking with the 
guerrilla, but to crush them by military force. This also meant a closer relationship 
with United States in comparison with the previous administrations as a partner in 
war against the illicit drugs and provider of military equipment for the operations 
against the guerrilla (Rojas, 2006 p. 86). He named the armed organisations “narco-
terrorists” which, in its parts, helped to motivate the US to invest resources to 
Colombia.88  
 
As Uribe’s focus was in the military spending, there was re-shifting of funds in the 
state´s budget. As part of re-shifting the funds and promoting administrative austerity, 
Uribe closed several embassies abroad, including that of Helsinki in 2002. The 
Ambassador in Stockholm was from then on accredited to Finland. According to 
previous Chargé d’Affaires e.p. of Colombia, Fulvia Elvira Benavides, the decision to 
                                                                
86 Uribe is currently being investigated on several matters relating to illegal activities as well as political 
violence connected to the paramilitary troops 
87 A consensus in the that the drug trade was in the heart of the Colombian issues which could thus 
only be resolved through international co-operation (Cardona, 2001, p. 56) 
88 The Bush Administration of the United States was fighting the War on Terror after the terrorist attack 
on the WTC towers in New York on the 9th of September 2001. 
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cut funds specifically from the from the Foreign Ministry in budget cuts is usual in 
Colombia, given that the Ministry’s budgets look extremely large when converted to 
pesos89 and Helsinki was chosen as one of the mission to be closed as there were 
not enough commercial activity between the countries to justify the existence of the 
Embassy. It should also be stated with high levels of certainty, that perhaps more 
significantly, Finland did not represent a politically important country to Colombia to 
which bilateral relationships would be fundamental. I consider it also to be fairly 
interesting to ponder, why Colombia maintained its representation in Finland almost 
10 years after the closure of the Finnish Embassy in Bogotá, but this could be 
explained purely with the desire to have a large net of mission abroad90 as well as 
the historically lucrative coffee trade. 
  
In the 2000 development aid had a growing significance in the Finnish foreign policy 
and human rights have had a high profile within the framework of this sector (Pyhälä, 
2016, p. 359). The election of Martti Ahtisaari as the President of the country and his 
involvement in the Kosovo peace process brought peacebuilding on the agenda of 
the Finnish diplomacy in the new way.91 Even if Uribe’s Colombia did not present an 
ideal partner for official bilateral relationship92, there were still projects in which 
Finland was involved. Aid had become important in the Finnish Colombian 
relationship: Colombia was, alongside of Haiti, the country in Latin America that 
received most development aid from Finland between the years of 2004 and 2014 
(ibid.  p. 352). During this time Finnish experts such as Helena Ranta,93 an 
odontologist and forensic dentist worked in Colombia in projects helping to identify 
the victims of the armed conflict (Pyhälä, 2018). On top becoming país amigo in 
2001, Finland also started to finance the peace initiatives of Francisco de Roux94.   
                                                                
89 “Todo por un ajuste fiscal que teníamos y pues en lo recorte siempre los Ministerios de Relaciones 
llevan las de perder porque como los presupuestos están dados en diferentes divisas, distintas al 
peso, cuando se convierten las divisas a pesos pues eso da unas cifras astronómicas y entonces todo 
el mundo dice “Uy pero qué cantidad de plata!”” (Benavides Cotes, 2018). 
90 As the country’s foreign policy was traditionally based on the multilateralism and cooperation in 
international institutions. 
91 For more information on the Finnish involvement in the Kosovo peace process, see e.g. Suominen & 
Karvinen, 2008.  
92 This can be read between the lines of several sources, such as Pärssinen 2006 or Pyhänen, 2019. 
93 Ranta worked in Colombia in 2007 (Ranta, 2012) 
94 Currently the head of the Comission for the Clarification of the Truth, Coexistence and Non-
Repetition within the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace in Colombia, previously the head of 
Program for Development and Peace in the Magdalena Medio. de Roux also participated in both 
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It is interesting to consider that the Colombian government judged that there was not 
enough trade with Finland to justify the existence of an Embassy in 2002 because 
from the Finnish side the situation was the opposite just a few years later. The years 
2005 and 2006 were records years for Finnish exports to Colombia, mainly due to 
large projects in which Finnish companies were involved in, most importantly the port 
of Cartagena95 to which Finnish companies provided the whole machinery (Finnish 
Embassy in Bogota, 2018).  
 
Even if the Uribe’s administration was officially not ready to negotiate with the leftist 
guerrilla groups,96 it did start open talks with the largest paramilitary group, United 
Self-Defence Group of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). AUC 
and other paramilitary groups were in fact responsible for the majority of the 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in Colombia between 1994 
and 2002 (Arnson, 2006 p. 1 & 2).97 The peace agreement was reached in 2002 and 
the paramilitary troops demobilized in 2004. This was a great advance in the peace 
process of Colombia, taking one armed group off the table and thus relieving the 
cross-pressure in which the civilian population was living in in the rural areas of the 
country.98  
 
As part of the peace process, Colombia continued to work with the international 
community even if the government's focus seemed to have somewhat shifted; it was 
wary of too much participation in deciding the details of the process whilst still 
seeking especially international financial help in resolving the conflict (Santos 
                                                                
symposiums on the Colombian peace process organised in the University of Helsinki in 2001 and 
2006.  
95 Because of its strategic location, Cartagena is the biggest port in Colombia and one of the largest in 
South America connecting to 750 other ports in 150 countries around the world and handling 60% of 
the bilateral trade with United States. It’s also one of the most modern and technologically advanced 
ports in Latin America (Puerto de Cartagena, 2018). 
96 As, according to the Vice-President, para bailar se necesita dos, or it takes two to tango, and the 
guerrillas were not willing to negotiate (Santos Calderón, 2005). 
97 One of the reasons for this was the habit of “purging” the claimed territories of suspected FARC 
sympathizers, which lead into massacres and tortures (For more details, see e.g. Arnson et al, 2005). 
98 There was, however, controversy about this process internationally and nationally as the 
paramilitaries had operated in collaboration with the army against the guerrilla and thus considered 
themselves patriotic heroes refusing to recognise any need for punishment for their activities. The 
government's decision to indeed let many of the leaders reintegrate in the society without jail time or 
extradition to the United States to response to drug charges against them sparked controversy 
(Arnson, 2006. p. 5-6) 
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Calderón, 2005, p. 85).  As a result, these years also saw high-level visits to Finland 
when Vice-President Francisco Santos Calderón and Defence Minister Jorge Uribe 
visited the country to participate in a colloquium organised in the University of 
Helsinki by the Iberoamerican Centre, Foreign Ministry of Finland and the Embassy 
of Colombia in Sweden99 about the peace process. The European Union was 
represented by Markus Lyra, the sub secretary of state of Finland, and Roberto 
Mora, the High Commissioner for Peace in Colombia attended as well (Pärssinen & 
Lammila, 2006, p. 7-8). An interesting detail too is to note that the current Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Carlos Holmes Trujillo (then Ambassador of Colombia in 
Sweden), participated in the organisation of the symposium 
 
Another Colombian Ministerial visit took place later in the same year as the Minister 
of Education Cecilia Maria Velez, visited the country. She returned the next year and 
bilateral mechanism of political consultations was started in 2006 in Helsinki. These 
consultations are meetings, during which the agenda for bilateral and multilateral 
issues is revised and discussed. They are held, in theory, every two years by 
alternating the hosting between the two countries. Information about relevant issues 
in multilateral organizations is shared as well as hopes and expectations for the 
future of the bilateral relationship (Benavides, 2018). 
  
The bilateral mechanism has seemed to work quite well and the relationship between 
the countries has stayed quite active also behind the scenes even without direct 
representation. According to Pyhälä (2018), the multilateral organizations such as the 
UN have had special importance in the Finno-Colombian relationship and the 
countries have supported each other’s candidates for several different positions in 
UN committees. During his term as an ambassador accredited to Colombia in 2006-
2011 there was also active talks about the re-establishing the missions. Neither were 
the Colombian ministers the only ones making official visits during this decade: the 
Finnish Sub Secretaries of state Markus Lyra and Pekka Huhtaniemi visited 
Colombia in 2007 and 2009 and in 2009 Huhtaniemi accompanied the Minister of 
Environment Paula Lehtomäki during her visit. 
  
                                                                
99 The first colloquium on this topic was organised by the same actors in 2001 when Finland was still 
not officially vinculated with the Colombian peace process. 
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It is somewhat interesting to consider that the period during which there was no direct 
representation from either country, was simultaneously the most active one for 
Ministerial visits. Even though it could be argued, that the official foreign policies of 
the countries did not complement each other during this time, in reality there had 
never been so many high level Colombian visits to Finland, even during the 
seemingly active 80’s and 90’s. Finland’s participation in the Colombian peace 
process as well as the creation of the mechanism for political consultation were 
important steps in strengthening the connection between the countries. Even if the 
economic potential of the relationship had not been as lucrative as it was once 
hoped, it seemed that both countries genuinely had something interesting to offer to 
each other: Finland saw potential in the markets of a developing country and 
Colombia had interest towards the Finnish expertise especially in post-conflict, 
education and technology. 
  
The first decade of 2000 had indeed launched Finland to global fame in technology 
and education. As Nokia had become one of the leading manufacturers of mobile 
phones in the world, it also contributing massively to the economic development of 
the country: in 2000 the company was responsible of 4% of the GDP of Finland and 
towards the end of the decade, it still provided almost 25% of the growth of the 
GDP100 (Yle, 2009). This created statistics that showed that the Finnish economy 
was growing faster than any other economy in the world (Uusi Suomi, 2011). 
Simultaneously Finland had become a top scoring nation in PISA tests; in 2000 the 
Finnish students scored first in reading and in 2003 reading and mathematics 
continuing reaching top places all through the 2000’s (Ministry for Education and 
Culture).   
  
The Colombian Minister of Communication, Maria del Rosario Guerra de la Espriella, 
also visited Finland with a commercial delegation in 2008, around the time when 
Colombia was adopting the European standard for mobile phones (Pyhälä 2018). 
Nokia was a big actor in the projects and the Minister was received in Finland by 
Honorary Consul Antero Pajari. 
 
                                                                
100 Gross domestic product, a monetary measure of the market value of all goods and services 
produced 
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4.7 2010 onwards: Politics without coffee? 
  
The economic crisis of 2008101 caused global shockwaves which also affected both 
Finland and Colombia in similar ways: because of the reduced buying potential of the 
countries to which products were exported, both countries saw lower level of 
production which, in turn, lead into unemployment and diminishing of GDP102. Finland 
was particularly badly affected, especially as the end of the decade also saw the 
downturn of the success of Nokia.103 This larger economic development affected the 
Foreign Ministry as well and, as happened during the recession of the 1990’s, 
Finland closed several of its diplomatic missions abroad (Ulkoministeriö, 2010). One 
of the missions closed was Venezuela and thus the Colombian affairs were once 
again handled by the Embassy of Colombia in Peru from 2011 onwards. It should be 
noted, however, that according to ambassador emeritus Pyhälä (2018), the 
discussion about reopening the Embassies between the countries was already being 
discussed at the start of the decade.104 
  
In 2010 Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, who had previously held various Ministerial 
positions, was elected as the President of Colombia. Already by 2011 the new 
government started hold exploratory meetings with FARC about possible peace 
negotiations (Semana, 1.11.2012). The meetings continued in secrecy to 2012 in one 
of the guarantor countries, Cuba, which had also hosted previous encounters 
between the two parties during the Pastrana era. Norway was chosen as other 
guarantor countries whilst Chile and Venezuela were chosen as ‘accompanying 
countries’ or facilitators. The meetings in Havana continued throughout the year and 
did not become public knowledge until August, when the previous president Uribe 
revealed that the government was participating in the negotiations (El Tiempo, 
19.8.2012). In September President Santos announced the signing of the General 
Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and 
                                                                
101 Caused originally by the banking crisis in the United States after the overheating of the economy 
leading into distrust and avoidance of lending between the banks which then caused collapse of 
several institutions (Amadeo, 2018). The crisis then spread and became global. 
102 In case of Finland, see for example Taloussanomat 2011, for Colombia Buitrago, 2009. 
103 See for example, Doz & Wilson 2017 
104 “No, jo, jo vuonna 2011, ennen ku mä palasin Suomeen ja ennen ku mä lopetin Bogotassa, niin mä 
useita kertoja keskustelin Kolumbian ulkoministerin Maria Angela Holguínin kanssa siitä, että 
perustettaisiin molemmat vastavuorosesti suurlähetystöt. Ja hänen piti tulla Suomeenkin 
keskustelemaan siitä, mut sit hänellä oli niin paljon muita kiireitä ettei hän koskaan ehtiny,“ 
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Lasting Peace (Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción 
de una paz estable y duradera). Despite several challenges during the negotiations 
such as kidnappings and confrontations leading to deaths on both sides,105 the 
dialogue continued for three years until 2015, when Special Jurisdiction for Peace or 
(Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz) was announced. 
  
Despite the fact that Finland was not part of these historic peace negotiations, the 
Finno-Colombian relationship took steps forward on the economic front. The 
European Union signed a free trade agreement with Colombia and Peru in 2012106, 
which entered in force in 2013. The same year also saw another Ministerial visit from 
Finland to Colombia when Minister for Foreign Trade and European Affairs of Finland 
Alexander Stubb visited the country. The Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja 
followed suit the next year. The bilateral political consultations were also advancing, 
and the second meeting was held in Helsinki in 2011. It is also worth noting that, 
perhaps for the first time in history, the trade balance between the countries had 
turned to be favourable for Finland: according to Jokelainen (2015) Colombia 
exported products worth 62 million euros in 2012 whilst the Finnish exports totalled 
81 million euros. 
  
During the trade promoting visit with the delegation of the newly established Team 
Finland107 Minister Stubb stated that Colombia was a growing market in which 
“economic growth, the calmed down security situation and amiability to investors 
were some of the reasons why [...] Finland has lifted Colombia back to its list of 
priorities” (Embassy of Finland in Lima, 2013b). 
  
It is then, clear that Finland had strong increasing interest in Colombia, as is also 
demonstrated in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ Plan of Action for Latin 
America and Caribbean of 2013: 
  
                                                                
105 See, for example, FARC-EP 2013 
106 This agreement was based on a Framework Cooperation Agreement between the Andean 
Community and European Commission signed in 1993 and which entered in force 1998. The Free 
Trade Agreements were later negotiated individually with members of the Andean Community (SICE). 
107 Team Finland is a network of organisations operating in teams in over 70 countries and bringing 
together the Finnish officials, publicly funded organisations and other central “Finland-actors” in each 
region. Each team is headed by the Ambassador (Embassy of Finland in Lima, 2013). 
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“The political and economic relationship between Finland and Colombia have a 
lot of unused potential. There is an intention to strengthen and deepen the 
political contact. The trade between the countries has been stable but can be 
increased in volume and diversified in structure. For example, in the field of 
forestry, mining and infrastructure Finland still has unused opportunities. On 
these sectors in 38 projects there has been disputes over land and human 
rights issues, which should be taken into consideration. Colombia participates in 
the cooperation between Finland and the Andean region108 in which especially 
the environment sector is central focus” (Ulkoministeriö, 2013). 109 
  
This intention to “deepen and strengthen the political contact” was realised during the 
same year by opening a Contact office for Bogota under the Embassy in Lima. The 
only reason why Finland did not directly open an Embassy in Bogotá was the fact 
that the Foreign Ministry was still not allowed to open new missions after the 2011 
reduction and the opening of a new Embassy would not have been approved by the 
Parliament (Pyhälä, 2018).110 Because of this, the Colombian representation was 
opened as a side office for the Embassy in Peru. 
  
The interest was, however, mutual and Colombia did take the step of reopening the 
Embassy in Helsinki. Fulvia Elvira Benavides was named as Chargé d’Affaires e.p. 
and she travelled to Finland in 2013 to reopen the mission. According to her, the 
Colombian interest to re-establish the representation in Finland was due to the fact 
that the country wanted to strengthen its relationship with the Nordic countries as it 
was working towards the peace agreement. For Colombians, she states (2018), the 
Nordic countries have a high profile in international peacebuilding and post-conflict 
                                                                
108 This cooperation was mainly in forms of development projects in the Andean region in 2010-2016. 
These projects were organised in Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador in the fields of biodiversity, 
energy and environment, forestry and hydrometeorology to promote renewable energies and clean 
technologies as well as energy efficiency in the region (Embassy of Finland in Lima, 2016). 
109 ”Suomalaisyritykset ovat toimineet etenkin metsä- ja elektroniikkateollisuuden, energiateknologian, 
meteorologian ja satamalogistiikan aloilla. Muun muassa metsä-, kaivos- ja infrastruktuurialoilla 
Suomella on vielä hyödyntämättömiä mahdollisuuksia. Näiden sektoreiden 38 hankkeisiin on kuitenkin 
liittynyt maanomistuskiistoja ja ihmisoikeusongelmia, mikä tulee ottaa huomioon. Kolumbia on mukana 
Suomen ja Andien alueen välisessä yhteistyössä, jossa etenkin ympäristöala on keskeisesti esillä.” 
110 “Ja syy siihen miksei ollu suurlähetystö oli ainoastaan se, että Eduskunta ei ois hyväksyny sen 
nimittämistä, sen kutsumista suurlähetystöksi” 
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reconstruction and, because of this, President Santos had identified Finland and as 
an embassy to be reopened.111  
  
High level visits have become almost a yearly occurrence between the countries in 
the 2010’s. Although travelling as a civilian the former President of Finland Tarja 
Halonen visited Colombia in 2015 and, in 2016, the Colombian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Patty Lodoño visited Helsinki when the third round of the bilateral consultation 
was held. Under Secretary of State (Vice Minister) of Internal and External Services 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pirkko Hämäläinen visited Colombia later that year 
(Embajada de Colombia en Finlandia, 2018). 
  
The long-awaited step to also reopen the Finnish Embassy after almost 25 years of 
absence was finally taken in 2017. Prime Minister Juha Sipilä travelled to Bogotá in 
October to inaugurate the new mission and Ambassador Jarmo Kuuttila was named 
the Ambassador of Finland in Colombia. A business delegation travelled with the 
Prime Minister and Chargé d’Affaires Benavides also attended the ceremony 
alongside the Foreign Minister Patti Lodoño. Minister Sipilä met with the President 
Santos and several joined projects were discussed, especially in education, forestry 
and environment and cyber security (Benavides, 2018). 
 
 
5.8 The future  
 
When looking at the future of the Finno-Colombian relations, it could be stated that 
there seems to be a great deal of interest in developing the relationship from both 
sides and this creates high hopes for the future. The opening of the embassies has 
created an irreplaceable bilateral canal through which the countries can advance 
their rapprochement on all levels. And this, in turn, will no doubt contribute to the 
level of interest and the commitment the countries have towards each other.  
 
                                                                
111 “Y tenía también en la mirada… aunque no era público todavía el tema de las negociaciones de 
paz. Y en esa medida siempre se ha considerado que los países nórdicos han sido… como… uno 
grandes apoyos en la construcción de… cultura de paz y de… solución de conflictos y por eso, tal 
vez, Finlandia también se miró como un… es uno de los nórdicos que podría también contribuir.” 
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Even though there was diplomatic representation in the past, the situation is very 
different today than it was in the 80’s and 90’s. As Finland’s foreign policy profile has 
shifted away from neutral, purely commercial politics towards playing a bigger role in 
crisis management as well as conflict resolution and human rights issues and 
Colombia is a country in which the society is undergoing a certain level of 
reconstruction as a part of a post-conflict process, there seem to be logical 
connection between the two countries which did not exist the last time both had 
mutual representation. Equally, Finland is now part of the European Union which has 
funded different projects in Colombia through loans from the European Bank, as well 
as signed free trade agreement and a visa waiver programme with Colombia. This 
would give reason to think, that currently the two countries have more potential in 
their bilateral relations than perhaps ever before.  
 
Naturally, there is still great focus on the economical aspect of the bilateral relations, 
and, according to Benavides (2018):  
 
“The fact that in both countries there is an embassy is a factor that 
contributes to the entrepreneurs, both Colombians and Finns, feel a greater, 
as, institutional support to advance in a few business issues. It is not easy, 
because they are very distant countries but where there are some interests in 
some fields where you can see an important contribution in both ways. Both 
Colombian products here and science and technology from Finland to 
Colombia. So ... I do hope that this process that we begin to return to have 
embassies both countries ... of high-level visits ... let's say that the road is 
easier to go forward. I would think [the relations] will continue to grow. That is 
why, because we have ... let us say that in both ways the needs have been 
identified. And that is an important step. Knowing what we want from here to 
there and from there to here.”112 
                                                                
112 “El hecho de que en ambos países haya embajada es un factor que contribuye a que los 
empresarios, tanto colombianos como finlandeses, sientan un mayor, como, un respaldo institucional 
para avanzar en unos temas de negocios. No es fácil, porque son países muy distantes, pero donde 
hay unos intereses que... en los que se… y unos campos donde pueda ver una contribución 
importante en ambas vías. Tanto de productos colombianos acá como de ciencia y tecnología de 
Finlandia hacía Colombia. Entonces… yo sí espero que este proceso que iniciamos de volver a tener 
embajadas ambos países… de las visitas de alto nivel… digamos contribuyan que a el camino sea 
más fácil de recorrer en adelante. [...] Yo pensaría que van a continuar creciendo. Por eso, porque 
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The Ambassador emeritus Pyhälä’s (2018) comment is also very optimistic:  
  
“I would say that the situation is very opportune. I do not see any reason why 
[the relationship] could not progress in a very positive manner. And the 
weight of the violence in the 90’s which contributed to the hesitation on the 
Finnish side does not exist anymore. And Colombia and Colombians, as far 
as I see, are reliable. I would say it is easy to negotiate with Colombians, 
they are very friendly so there should not be any kind of problems.”113 
 
If the year 2018 was still setting up for the diplomatic Mission in Bogotá, there are 
some great plans and projects already in place. Colombia has been especially active 
in cultural exchange and in 2018 Finland was selected as one of the destinations for 
the Foreign Ministry’s programme in which children from the worst affected areas by 
the conflict get to become the ambassadors of their country abroad through music 
and sports. A group of young people came to visit the Finnish capital and a similar 
visit is planned for the year in course. The bilateral consultations were held in Bogotá 
in late 2018 and currently there are plans for bilateral agreements. Equally, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, became the first 
Colombian Foreign Minister to visit Finland in March 2019, creating a huge positive 
mile-stone for the progress and growth of the bilateral relationship. During his visit he 
also announce that the Colombian Embassy in Finland would be raised to the 
category of a Mission lead by an Ambassador instead of Chargé d’Affaires 
demonstrating that bilateral relationship is indeed on a higher level than even before. 
6. Conclusions 
 
It can be stated that through the narrative approach we can clearly see the larger 
foreign policy tendencies of each country reflected through the context bilateral 
                                                                
ha... hemos… digamos que en ambas vías se ha identificado las necesidades. Y eso es un paso 
importante. Saber qué queremos de aquí para allá y de allá para acá.” 
113 “No mä sanoisin että… että tilanne on hyvin otollinen. Et tuota… En näe mitään estettä etteikö ne 
vois kehittyä hyvin positiivisesti. Ja se… tuota se painolasti mikä, mitä 90-luvun väkivaltaset olot 
vaikutti Suomen niinku empimiseen sillon niin sillon… niin sitä tilannetta ei enää ole. Ja että 
Kolumbia… Nähdäkseni kolumbialaiset on luotettavia. [...] mä sanoisin että kolumbialaisten kanssa on 
helppo neuvotella. Ovat hyvin ystävällisiä että ei… ei pitäis olla minkäänlaisia ongelmia.” 
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relationship. In this sense, as the variety of sources were used to create a chronological 
sequence and narrative of events with smaller details of the Finno-Colombian 
relationship, this method creates a cohesive historical arch for both countries.  
 
When answering the question on how well the bilateral relationship analysed reflect 
the official historical narrative of foreign policy, it can be stated that in their beginning, 
the Finno-Colombian relationships seem to reflect this narrative; when the official 
contact was established both countries were looking to expand their foreign relations 
especially through trade. However, from the 1960 onwards despite Colombia’s official 
desire to create bilateral agreements, the reality of the unbalanced trade with Finland 
and the Finnish difficulties in obtaining importing licenses represent a rupture between 
the official narrative and the practical foreign trade policy choices. Finland’s several 
attempts to keep the trade going and advance the relations with e.g. ministerial visits 
despite the difficulties seem to be in line with the country’s official foreign policy at the 
time.  
 
Even though the 1970’s continued with the same tendencies, the presidential visit of 
1979 and the following establishment of mixed commission gave indications that 
Colombia wished to put the liberal free trade policy in practice. When the embassies 
were opened in the following years, there was real indication that these steps could 
have potentially helped the bilateral trade relation to grow to its full potential.  However, 
as the internal conflict in Colombia escalated, this could eventually not be. The 
recession in Finland forced the country to reduce its foreign missions and as the 
European integration reached Finland, the bilateral relationship between the distant 
coffee partners seemed to have become secondary to both countries  
 
In political development, it should be noted, that during its history despite its official 
narrative of liberal foreign policy, Colombia has been more inclined to power politics 
and ideas more associated with realism such as rejecting international community and 
law when they have been at odds with ideas of self-help (see examples of accusations 
of human rights violations during the presidency of Turbay & Uribe). Even though 
Colombia does at least superficially commit to the principles of the liberal world order, 
this has not always been reflected in the country’s values or internal policies.  
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Despite the realism tendencies of Samper’s and especially Uribe’s administrations, 
Colombia has been committed to the international organisations such as the UN and 
the OAS. This demonstrates that at least on the surface, the country has abided to the 
ethics of this side of the liberal politics. This has not always been the case with free 
market policies however, as the Colombian economy has gone through periods of 
strong protectionism which has also affected its relationship with Finland as the 
bilateral trade was the major uniting factor before the year 2000.  
 
Finland on the other hand has always underlined the importance of liberal world order, 
including free trade, and aimed to stay away from power politics. It could be argued, 
that the decades of Finlandization represented the time during which Finland was 
forced to adapt its practical policy choices to the realism of bipolar Cold War world 
order, but despite of this, at least on the surface, the country always intended to 
maintain bilateral relationship with both sides of the conflict as well as participate in 
multilateral organizations. After the 1990’s this principle has been clearly demonstrated 
also in the practical policy choices and actions, especially as part of the European 
Union.  
  
On the Colombian side, another important tendency to note is that since at least the 
1950’s Colombia’s public offices have functioned with little continuation as each 
incoming Minister (and President) “shakes a governmental agency from top to bottom” 
creating a situation in which the plans and objectives of the previous administration are 
largely abandoned (see e.g. Hunter, 1962 p. 23).  This has been less so the case in 
Finland, where political consensus and continuity have been more typical political 
trends. In Colombia, the lack of continuity seems to have made it difficult to create long 
term plans of commercial cooperation as can be seen clearly with the complications in 
obtaining import licences for the Finnish products in the 1970’s and 80’s; despite the 
best promises, concrete actions were lacking perhaps because of the next 
administration's policy choices.  It could also be stated that Finland, as many other 
countries, were victims of bad timing when trying to enter the Colombian market in full 
force.  
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Even though there are European countries with which Colombia has very strong 
relationship due to historic reasons, especially Spain and France (Benavides, 2018) 
and sometimes it seems that it is hard to shift the country’s focus away from those 
countries on the European continent and even harder to take it away from the 
country up to the North, that is to say, the United States. Even with this being the 
case, Finland seem to have gained its place on the Colombian vision. From the 
Finnish perspective, Colombia is still relatively unknown, even in the Latin American 
context. However, there are many fields in which Finland would have much to offer to 
Colombia (ibid.) and the post-conflict Colombia offers interesting business 
opportunities for Finland.  
 
From the 2000 onwards, it could be stated that Finno-Colombian relationship offer a 
fairly consistent practical demonstration of the political narrative of the foreign policy 
of both countries; Finland has been involved in the Colombian peace process from 
the 2001 onwards (see e.g. Feodorow, 2001) and both countries have maintained the 
diplomatic and commercial relationship with several Ministerial visits with business 
delegations as well as mutual cooperation in multilateral organisations. It is worth 
mentioning, that Finland has seemed to be more active in maintaining the contact 
between the countries with higher number of ministerial visits as well as the fact that 
the Finnish embassy has always been headed by an ambassador, whilst Colombia 
has operated it Mission in Finland under a chargé d’affaires. Despite of this, the 
reopening of the Embassies in 2010’s could be seen as the reaffirmation of both 
countries’ commitment to extensive bilateral collaboration with other democratic 
states.  
 
The future of the relationship also looks very positive. The diplomatic representation 
of the two countries has never been on such high level as it is right now, with both 
countries (soon) having a permanent Mission lead by a resident Ambassador and the 
relationship advancing especially with bilateral visits as well as agreements. The 
commercial aspects of the relationship seem to also be moving forwards, thanks to 
the more stable political and economic conditions of Colombia and active work done 
by representatives of both countries. Even if the trade balance is still favourable to 
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Colombia,114 the relationship has changed and grown from its last peak in the 1980’s. 
It seems like in the future, the bilateral relationship can be based on more than just 
coffee, and that Finland and Colombia might not be such distant partners after all. 
 
 
                                                                
114 See, Tulli, 2018.  
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